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Twenty-First Century Formalism 
THOMAS B. NACHBAR* 
Formalism is one of the most widely applied but misun-
derstood features of law. Embroiled in a series of conflicts 
over the course of the twentieth century, formalism’s mean-
ing has become confused as formalism has been enlisted by 
both proponents and opponents of specific legal methodol-
ogies. For some, formalism has simply become an epithet 
used to describe virtually anything they dislike in legal 
thinking. Used often and inconsistently as a stand-in (and 
frequently a strawman), formalism’s distinct identity has 
been lost, its meaning merged with whatever methodology 
it is being used to support or attack. 
This Article seeks to separate formalism from those de-
bates, identifying formalism for what it is: a commitment to 
form in legal thinking. Form is critical to understanding 
law; because law is a shared enterprise, it can only be un-
derstood and applied as it exists in some form. Formalism 
recognizes the form-bound nature of law and expands on 
that recognition by engaging with law in its various forms 
rather than as an abstraction. 
The Article makes three main contributions to under-
standing formalism: First, it provides a modern definition 
of formalism, separating it from confusion over formalism 
caused by its invocation in a series of debates over law in 
the twentieth century. Second, it describes how formalism 
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operates in methodologies and contexts beyond textualism 
and originalism, the two methodologies with which formal-
ism is usually identified. Third, it explores the power of 
formalism beyond its value in determining the content of 
law. The form of law is what drives the various ways the 
law categorizes conduct, and law’s categories in turn give 
meaning to conduct beyond just the application of enforce-
able legal constraints. It is time for us to bring formalism 
into the twenty-first century and recognize it for its distinct 
role in understanding law and legal institutions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Formalism is an approach to law that provokes strong respons-
es. To Roscoe Pound, formalism is the “mechanical jurispru-
dence”1 he derided. To H.L.A. Hart, formalism is a “vice” that dis-
guises the choices that judges make.2 To Cass Sunstein, it is at 
worst a “sham”3 and at best an attempt to make law deductive and 
mechanical.4 Steven Smith describes formalism as “unduly rigid or 
impervious to experience or new information.”5 To Richard Pos-
 
 1 Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 608 
(1908); see also Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 (1936) (“If our appraisals are mechanical and superficial, 
the law which they generate will likewise be mechanical and superficial, to be-
come at last but a dry and sterile formalism.”). 
 2 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 129 (3d ed. 2012) (“The vice known 
to legal theory as formalism or conceptualism consists in an attitude to verbally 
formulated rules which both seeks to disguise and to minimize the need for such 
choice, once the general rule has been laid down.”). 
 3 See Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 
756 (1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning] (“Often reasoning 
by classification is indeed a sham, in the sense that some judgment of value is 
being made but not disclosed.”). 
 4 Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 636, 638–39 (1999) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically] (“[F]ormalism is 
an attempt to make the law both autonomous, in the particular sense that it does 
not depend on moral or political values of particular judges, and also deductive, 
in the sense that judges decide cases mechanically on the basis of preexisting 
law and do not exercise discretion in individual cases.”). 
 5 Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 428 
(1990) (“‘[F]ormalism’ is . . . more commonly[] used in a second, pejorative 
sense to refer to thinking that is not only structured, but that is unduly rigid or 
impervious to experience or new information.”); see also Daniel Farber, The 
Ages of American Formalism, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 92–93 (1995) [hereinafter 
Farber, Ages] (“Among its other flaws, formalism sought to hold the law captive 
to the past, in the interest of order, logic, and stability . . . .”); James G. Wilson, 
The Morality of Formalism, 33 UCLA L. REV. 431, 431 (1985) (“Many modern 
legal scholars have performed Gilmore’s skeptical function well, condemning or 
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ner, it is an “unworkable ideal.”6 According to Fred Schauer, 
“formalist” has essentially become an insult: “Few judges or 
scholars would describe themselves as formalists, for a congratula-
tory use of the word ‘formal’ seems almost a linguistic error.”7 As 
Ernest Weinrib explains, “[f]ormalism is like a heresy driven un-
derground, whose tenets must be surmised from the derogatory 
comments of its detractors.”8 Many leading scholars simply treat 
formalism as a synonym for any combination of intellectual 
tendencies considered shameful in lawyers.9 
Not all uses of formalism are so negative, though. Justice An-
tonin Scalia, widely acknowledged as the scion of modern formal-
ism,10 embraced formalism as a label: “Of all the criticisms leveled 
against textualism, the most mindless is that it is ‘formalistic.’ The 
answer to that is, of course it’s formalistic!”11 Scalia’s formalism is 
 
reluctantly accepting formalism as an antiquated concept implying rigidity, im-
mutability, conservatism, and even naiveté.”). 
 6 Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1653, 1656, 1666 (1990). 
 7 Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988) [hereinafter 
Schauer, Formalism]. 
 8 Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of the 
Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 950 (1988). 
 9 See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 
101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 923 (2003) (describing a tendency among law profes-
sors to describe judicial blunders as a result of acting “‘woodenly,’ ‘mechanical-
ly,’ or ‘formalistically,’ with insufficient attention to history, policy, and nu-
ance”). 
 10 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitu-
tional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15 (1997) (“In contemporary debates, 
perhaps the most prominent formalist is Justice Antonin Scalia . . . .”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Justice Scalia’s Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 530 
(1997) (book review) (“We might even say that Justice Scalia is the clearest and 
most self-conscious expositor of democratic formalism in the long history of 
American law.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism Without a Foundation: Stern 
v. Marshall, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 205 [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Founda-
tion]. 
 11 Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scal-
ia, Common-Law Courts] (emphasis omitted). 
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commonly associated with textualism12 or originalism13 (or both14), 
but Scalia was virtually alone in taking up the mantel of formal-
ism.15 For many, Scalia’s formalism was cause for derision,16 and 
 
 12 See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpreta-
tion: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE 
L.J. 1750, 1762 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, States as Laboratories] (describing a 
“textualist approach” as being “associated most closely with Justice Scalia’s 
legisprudence”); Sunstein, Empirically, supra note 4, at 639 (“Formalism . . . 
entails an interpretive method that relies on the text of the relevant law and that 
excludes or minimizes extratextual sources of law.”); see also Schauer, Formal-
ism, supra note 7, at 511–12 (describing a formalistic opinion as hiding its 
choice behind “linguistic inexorability”). 
 13 Chemerinsky, Foundation, supra note 10, at 205 (“Formalism is inherent 
to the originalism of conservative Justices like Scalia and Thomas who believe 
that the meaning of a constitutional provision is fixed when it is adopted and 
changeable only by constitutional amendment.”). 
 14 Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers 
Jurisprudence, 126 YALE L.J. 346, 355 (2016) (“[F]ormalism tends to be associ-
ated with both textualist and originalist theories of constitutional interpreta-
tion . . . .”); Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formal-
ism, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 853, 859 (1990) (“[F]ormalism is inextricably tied to 
both textualism and originalism . . . .”); Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits 
of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11 (1998) (grouping together 
“[t]extualism, originalism, and other brands of formalism”); Farber, Ages, supra 
note 5, at 91 (“Formalists believe that certainty, stability, and logic are the pri-
mary values to be sought . . . . To implement these values, they embrace formal-
ist methods, such as textualism as a system for interpreting statutes, adherence to 
established doctrine in common-law cases, and originalism as a method of con-
stitutional interpretation.”). 
 15 But not completely. See, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, The Unconstitution-
ality of “Signing and Not-Enforcing,” 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 113, 114 
(2007) (claiming to apply an “originalist-formalist conception of law”); Law-
rence B. Solum, The Positive Foundations of Formalism: False Necessity and 
American Legal Realism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2493–94 (2014) (book re-
view) (arguing for a “neoformalist” approach to legal interpretation). Similarly, 
Frank Easterbrook favorably describes textualism as “mechanical” despite the 
pejorative sense in which Pound used the term. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, 
History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
61, 67 (1994) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Statutory Interpretation] (arguing that 
the answer to many difficult questions facing judges can be answered by a “rela-
tively unimaginative, mechanical process of interpretation”); Pound, supra note 
1, at 607. 
 16 David M. Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1791, 1796 (1998) (attempting to demonstrate “the rigid, unconvincing character 
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even Justice Scalia occasionally fell into the pejorative use of the 
term.17 
Mostly, though, modern treatment of formalism results in con-
fusion: one set of modern “antiformalists”18 attacking one version 
of formalism and modern originalists, along with other self-
described “neoformalists,”19 defending another. In some areas of 
law, like separation of powers, formalism (juxtaposed with func-
tionalism) plays a central role.20 But even in an area like separation 
of powers, there is confusion over what role formalism plays.21 
This Article seeks to clear the confusion22 about a concept so 
widely debated in legal discourse. Rather than follow the extreme 
positions taken by either the anti- or neo-formalists, I propose an 
understanding of modern formalism for what it is: a commitment to 
form in legal thinking. 
 
of [Justice Scalia’s] formalistic interpretive methodology”); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 
YALE L.J. 331, 416 (1991) (“I am not sure that Justice Scalia’s formalist vision 
will make much headway in the Court.”) [hereinafter Eskridge, Overriding]. 
 17 Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 174 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (deriding 
a “formalistic distinction” that ignores practical difference between concurrent 
and consecutive sentences). 
 18 Cf. Sunstein, Empirically, supra note 4, at 639 (grouping various ap-
proaches opposed to formalism as “antiformalist”). 
 19 See Solum, supra note 15, at 2494. 
 20 See generally Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to 
Separation-of-Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. 
REV. 488, 526 (1987) [hereinafter Strauss, Foolish Inconsistency]; John F. Man-
ning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
1939, 1958–61 (2011); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transcending Formalism 
and Functionalism in Separation-of-Powers Analysis: Reframing the Appoint-
ments Power After Noel Canning, 64 DUKE L.J. 1513, 1527–28 (2015). 
 21 Compare M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of 
Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1138 (2000) (“For the formalist, questions of 
horizontal governmental structure are to be resolved by reference to a fixed set 
of rules and not by reference to some purpose of those rules.”) with Richard H. 
Pildes, Institutional Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and Public Law, 
2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2 (describing “institutional formalism” as “formalism 
[that] consists of treating the governmental institution involved as more or less a 
formal black box”). 
 22 See Sunstein, Empirically, supra note 4, at 638 (“It is not easy to define 
the term ‘formalism,’ partly because there is no canonical kind of formalism.”). 
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Formalism is not a blank slate, though. The twentieth century 
saw two distinct battles over formalism, and much of our current 
understanding of formalism is shaped by the ways formalism was 
enlisted on both sides of those battles.23 Consequently, understand-
ing modern formalism requires one to distinguish it from other ide-
as that merged into formalism in the course of those two conflicts: 
the early twentieth century realist rebellion against the classical, 
Langdellian legal orthodoxy and the late twentieth century debates 
over interpretation, especially constitutional interpretation.24 
Once we separate formalism from the roles it has been assigned 
in these twentieth century conflicts, we can better identify its char-
acteristics and implications. That inquiry reveals how formalism 
unites almost all approaches to legal interpretation. We’re all for-
malists in that we all believe form is relevant to understanding law, 
even if there is disagreement about how form is relevant to under-
standing law.25 Although formalism is often painted as the rigid 
application of rules,26 it need not be so. A commitment to form can 
be rigid or flexible in the same way other methodological com-
mitments can be held to different degrees.27 
Far from inflexible and rigid thinking that avoids nuance, for-
malism provides a unique perspective on law and the value of legal 
 
 23 See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: 
THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 1–3 (2010) (providing an overview of for-
malism-realism debate in American legal thought). 
 24 See id. I argue below that the picture of formalism applied by realists was 
a caricature, but it is also easy to over-state the degree to which the realist 
movement was solely a rebellion against formalism. See NEIL DUXBURY, 
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 10 (1995) (describing simple charac-
terization of a realist rebellion against formalism as a “myth”). The views of the 
realists and the formalists were far more complex than either simple label sug-
gests. Id. 
 25 Cf. Harvard Law School, The 2015 Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Jus-
tice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE, at 8:30 (Nov. 25, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg (in which Justice Kagan 
states, “I think we’re all textualists now”). 
 26 See Farber, Ages, supra note 5, at 91. 
 27 See id. (“[T]houghtful formalists admit that on occasion the formalist 
methods must be tempered in order to keep the legal system from becoming 
unbearably rigid and closed to current social values.”); Solum, supra note 15, at 
2489–91 (comparing “absolute formalists” with “perfect realists”). 
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rules. Law works by categorizing behavior, and it is the form, not 
the substance, of legal rules that drives that categorization.28 Those 
categories affect outcomes,29 but even when determining outcomes 
is hard (when the substance of the law is uncertain), form guides 
by setting the terms of the debate. For instance, equality is a major 
subject of debate in U.S. constitutional law, but only because the 
Equal Protection Clause requires “equal protection of the laws”30 
instead of a different formulation, like “fair” or “reasonable” 
treatment. By adopting rules of a particular form, rule makers also 
signal how much discretion is being devolved on adjudicators, 
providing important information about the allocation of responsi-
bility in the legal system.31 
In addition to providing the means to discuss the substance of 
law, the form of legal rules communicates information about how 
society views particular behavior—different forms of legal prohi-
bition or sanction express society’s views on the nature of particu-
lar conduct.32 For instance, if society’s goal is to reduce traffic fa-
talities, choosing to criminalize speeding carries a different mean-
ing (by altering the meaning of the underlying conduct) than other 
ways to reduce fatalities, like offering subsidized traffic safety 
classes or requiring that all cars have airbags installed. It is formal-
ism that separates law from other systems of social control, and it 
is only formalism that can account for the ways that the law’s form 
guides and controls the way we think about legal rules. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I defines formalism as 
a commitment to form in legal thinking and describes the role of 
formalism as central to theories of rule-based decision-making33 
before defending this definition from the misperceptions generated 
by a hundred years of attacks on formalism. After discussing the 
realist and formalist debates of the early twentieth century, I con-
sider usage of the term in the late twentieth century, which (follow-
 
 28 See infra Part III.A.1. 
 29 See Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 539–40. 
 30 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 31 See FREDRICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 158 (1991). 
 32 See infra Part III.B. 
 33 See Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 548. See generally SCHAUER, 
supra note 31, at 10–12. 
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ing the realist tradition) is mostly negative and largely unhelpful 
for understanding what separates formalism from other approaches 
to law. Although frequently equated with several legal methodolo-
gies—textualism, originalism, and the rigid application of rules—
formalism is a component of a variety of methodologies rather than 
a methodology in its own right. 
Leaving the battles of the twentieth century behind, Part II car-
ries forward this understanding of formalism to describe how it is a 
distinct component of different interpretive methodologies. I then 
consider how formalism operates in two areas of the law—
procedure and constitutional separation of powers—that demon-
strate the use of this richer understanding of formalism. 
Finally, Part III reconsiders the role that formalism should play 
in legal thinking. Form is not only relevant to outcomes. It is the 
form of rules that determines the language we use to think about 
the law; the same rule expressed in different forms can have very 
different meanings to those who apply, and are subject, to the rule. 
So understood, formalism has major implications for the scholar-
ship exploring the power of law to affect behavior not only through 
sanctions but also through the social expression conveyed by those 
sanctions: the expressive function of the law.34 It is only by con-
sidering the forms of law—as distinct from the underlying rules 
that form represents—that we can appreciate all of the ways that 
form affects how we talk and think about law. 
 
 34 See generally RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW 
1–9, 11–13 (2015); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive The-
ories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1540 (2000); 
Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397, 400 
(1965); Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 
MINN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions 
Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 592 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expres-
sive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022–24 (1996) [hereinafter 
Sunstein, Expressive Function]. 
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I. CONSTRUCTING FORMALISM 
Although the term “formalism” is a common one, there is no 
authoritative definition of formalism in law.35 Formalism describes 
a practice and a particular approach to understanding law that is 
implicit in many legal methodologies. Unfortunately, opponents of 
formalism (or, rather, opponents of specific methodologies associ-
ated with formalism) have taken to using it as an epithet to de-
scribe virtually anything they dislike in legal thinking.36 Conse-
quently, in addition to providing an affirmative definition of for-
malism, it is necessary to disentangle formalism from what have 
become rhetorical ad hominem uses (“formalistic” or “formulaic”) 
leveled during scholarly and judicial battles over various legal 
methodologies. Liberating our attention to formalism from the 
quarrels over specific formalist methodologies frees us to engage 
formalism on its own terms. 
Once we do so, even a brief consideration of formalism reveals 
that it is both nuanced and pervasive throughout the legal system. 
Although formalism represents a commitment to rules, it is no 
more or less rigid than other interpretive practices, and despite re-
ports of its demise, formalism not only persists, it continues to 
dominate legal thinking, dwarfing virtually any other approach to 
law.37 
A. Pure Formalism 
In its most basic sense, formalism is a commitment to form in 
legal thinking. It reflects an approach that determines the meaning 
of law by looking at its form. This might seem commonsensical or 
even almost automatic. We all use the form of law—for instance, 
its text, which is an attribute of form—to determine legal meaning. 
That need not be the case. If law were contained in the intuitions of 
philosopher kings who decided all cases that came before them, it 
 
 35 Sunstein, Empirically, supra note 4, at 638 (“It is not easy to define the 
term ‘formalism,’ partly because there is no canonical kind of formalism.”). 
 36 See infra Part I.B. 
 37 See infra Part I.B. 
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could exist without form or without regard to its form.38 Form 
would be irrelevant to determining the content of the law, and con-
sequently, form would not affect the content of the law. Modern 
legal systems, however, are not predicated on the intuitions of phi-
losopher kings. The laws exist in various forms, and formalism is 
the recognition that those forms control the content of the law. 
Formalism is the recognition, for instance, that the content of a 
smoking prohibition changes whether it is contained in a statute, a 
no-smoking sign posted by a restaurant, or a parental reprimand. 
Formalism is reflected in the concern that a jury verdict has a dif-
ferent meaning than a judge’s finding39 or that the forms of gov-
ernment adopted by the Constitution—the division of executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches—must be respected, even if they 
cannot be justified in a particular case.40 Formalism is everywhere 
in law and legal argumentation. When John Marshall argued that 
the Necessary and Proper Clause41 was an extension of congres-
sional power rather than a limitation because it was located in the 
power-conferring parts of the Constitution,42 he was making an 
argument based on form. Finally, formalism is the means we use to 
figure out what is and what is not law; it tells us that congressional 
resolutions complying with bicameralism and presentment have a 
different legal meaning than those issued by one house or a com-
mittee and that the President’s statements have different legal ef-
 
 38 See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 170—71 (B. Jowett trans., Oxford 
Univ. Press 3d ed. 1925) (c. 375 B.C.E.) (introducing the concept of “philoso-
pher kings”). 
 39 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 40 See Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 16, at 405 (“Under formalist ideol-
ogy, the Court’s role in statutory interpretation is not to facilitate the dominant 
political coalition’s evolving preferences, but to protect the formal structures of 
our democracy.”). 
 41 U.S. CONST. art. I § 8. 
 42 M‘Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 419 (1819) (“The clause 
is placed among the powers of Congress, not among the limitations on those 
powers.”). Indeed, Marshall provided this as the “1st” reason for interpreting the 
clause as an expansion rather than a restriction of congressional power, ahead 
even the text of the clause itself, which he listed “2d.” Id. at 419–20. 
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fect when they appear in the Federal Register than when they ap-
pear on Twitter.43 
Robert Summers advanced perhaps the purest understanding of 
this sense of formalism: a consideration of form in the legal sys-
tem.44 Summers’s work was an attempt to identify the variety of 
forms existing in the legal system and how law’s form is distinct 
from its substance.45 Rather than an attempt to describe the role 
form plays in modern debates about the meaning of law, Summers 
avoided those modern debates, allowing himself to see the role of 
form in law more clearly.46 Formalism is everywhere in law, and 
law’s form tells us more about whether a particular rule applies to 
our conduct than does the substance of the rule itself. I don’t have 
to know what the speed limit is in order to know that I must com-
ply with it. All I need to know is that the limit follows the forms 
(in terms of origin, process, and (usually) publication on a sign I 
can read) that qualifies it as enforceable law. 
1. THE FORM OF FORMALISM 
If formalism is commitment to form, we need a working under-
standing of form. “Form,” as Ernest Weinrib explains, 
is the ensemble of characteristics that constitute the 
matter in question as a unity identical to that of oth-
er matters of the same kind and distinguishable 
from matters of a different kind. Form is not sepa-
rate from content but is the ensemble of characteris-
 
 43 See Federal Register Act of 1935, 44 U.S.C. § 1505 (requiring all presi-
dential proclamations and orders with general legal effect to be published in 
Federal Register). 
 44 See generally Robert S. Summers, The Formal Character of Law, 51 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 242, 242–45 (1992) (explaining that formality is a fundamental 
feature of law). 
 45 Id. at 242 (“I define a ‘formal’ feature of law as one that is in some way 
independent of the substantive content of the law.”). 
 46 Id. at 245 (“I must stress that I will not report the results of any legal 
research nor will I reveal any discoveries of fact about legal phenome-
na . . . . [Rather,] I will re-order, reconceptuali[ze], and introduce a nomencla-
ture for much that is already very familiar. This will sharpen our perception of 
formal features in diverse legal phenomena.”). 
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tics that marks the content as determinate, and 
therefore marks the content as a content.47 
Weinrib’s definition points out two important characteristics of 
form: First, form is relevant to distinction—to grouping things of 
like character with each other and excluding things that are dissim-
ilar.48 Second, and more important for present purposes, form is 
used to identify content.49 A necessary implication of recognizing 
form as the means through which we identify content is that form 
is necessary for identifying content. It is an acknowledgement that 
content might have a meaning apart from its form, but that mean-
ing cannot be understood by an observer except through attributes 
of form.50 This characteristic of form is hardly unique to law; as 
Weinrib explains, we can only identify a table as a table because it 
exhibits characteristics (“elevation, flatness, hardness, typical func-
tion, and so on”) that mark it as a table.51 Similarly, law does not 
present itself as law at a purely conceptual level but has to be con-
fronted, considered, and manipulated through some form. Because 
we are not ruled by philosopher kings who can access their intui-
 
 47 Weinrib, supra note 8, at 958. 
 48 See id. at 959–60. 
 49 See id. Here, Weinrib’s approach to form diverges from that of Robert 
Summers. Summers defines form as anything “independent of the substantive 
content of the law.” Summers, supra note 44, at 242. That broad definition leads 
Summers to identify a very wide variety of “forms,” from “the degree of com-
pleteness of a rule” to “foundational rules and other legal precepts” (somewhat 
resembling Hart’s rule of recognition) to a “methodology for adherence to 
common law precedent” to “administrative bodies and administrative proce-
dures” to “some special mode of protection of basic individual rights.” Id. at 
245–46. Summers’s definition is not only broad, it is negative—Summers essen-
tially defines form as “not content.” Id. at 242. As a result, Summers’s approach 
is not interested in identifying form’s role in the content of law but rather to 
identify how form exists apart from the content. See id. at 246. It is not clear 
how successful he was in maintaining the distinction. His last category of form, 
for instance, is itself defined by the content (the protection of fundamental 
rights) of a particular rule. Id. But the fact that form and substance affect each 
other only underscores his larger point: that form plays an important role in our 
understanding of law. See id. at 259–60. 
 50 See Weinrib, supra note 8, at 961. 
 51 Id. at 958–59. 
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tions directly, we can only identify the content of law by observing 
its form. 
Recognizing the importance of form necessarily acknowledges 
that the complete content of the law is inherently unknowable apart 
from the form we experience; that all we can really know is the 
law as represented by its form. This is so even if thought can exist 
apart from language.52 Our notional philosopher kings might be 
able to think without language, but we do not rely on individuals to 
set and apply the law. Our law is an inherently social and therefore 
inherently shared enterprise.53 That sharing has to take place in 
some form decipherable to all participants in the legal system.54 
Before we can play chess, we have to agree on its rules,55 and be-
fore we can do that, we have to agree on the rules for talking about 
rules.56 Formalism identifies as the first rule of law that law is pri-
marily determined by looking at its form, not by an individually 
held but unshared understanding of its content. 
2. FORMALISM AS RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING 
The reason why formalism must have a place of privilege in 
understanding law has to do with the nature of law as governance 
by rule. As Fred Schauer explains, “[a]t the heart of the word ‘for-
malism,’ in many of its numerous uses, lies the concept of deci-
sionmaking according to rule.”57 Schauer’s concern (and his usage 
of “rule”) goes to the fundamental distinction between “rules” and 
“standards.”58 “Rules” (such as a numerically defined and objec-
 
 52 See id. 
 53 See id. at 64 (describing legal interpretation as “a social enterprise”). 
 54 See id. 
 55 Cf. JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 108–10 (2d ed. 1990) 
(describing playing chess and other acts as “normative acts based on constitutive 
rules,” which shape “new forms of behavior”). 
 56 See JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS 48 (1969) (distinguishing between the 
meaning intended by a sentence and the need for rules of grammar as a “conven-
tional means of achieving the intention to produce” that meaning in the mind of 
the listener). 
 57 Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 510. 
 58 Compare id. (discussing how rules function by “screening off from a 
decisionmaker factors that a sensitive decisionmaker would otherwise take into 
account”), with HART, supra note 2, at 124–35. 
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tively measured speed limit) provide clear rules for deciding cases 
but are not sensitive to particular circumstances (whether there was 
some justification for driving so fast).59 “Standards” (such as a 
negligence or recklessness standard) provide less guidance but al-
low for more consideration of whether the particular case falls 
within the ambit of the prohibition.60 Although rules might be 
based on underlying justifications—they are “instantiations” of a 
justification for acting—decision according to rule requires a 
choice: to pay more attention to a rule than to the underlying justi-
fications for the rule.61 When that happens, the instantiation of the 
justification effectively displaces the justification itself and the rule 
governs the relevant conduct even if its justification would not.62 
Even though we all know that the twenty-five mile-per-hour speed 
limit on Main Street is there to promote safety, we will still break 
the law if it would be safe to drive over twenty-five miles per hour 
in a particular instance. The same is not true of a “reckless driving” 
law. The justification (deterring reckless driving) would be rele-
vant to deciding an individual case because guilt would depend on 
whether the driving was in fact the reckless driving that the law 
seeks to deter.63 
But rules themselves go beyond justification to the question of 
how decision-making authority is allocated in a legal system.64 
Rules allow authors to constrain the discretion of adjudicators who 
 
 59 See Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 510. 
 60 See HART, supra note 2, at 124–35; Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Stand-
ards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 588–90 (1992); Pierre Schlag, 
Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 379 (1985). Schauer himself devi-
ates from this usage by focusing not on specificity but on the degree to which 
the rule or standard deviates from its underlying justification. SCHAUER, supra 
note 31, at 104 n.35. He rightly points out that a standard that tracks its underly-
ing justification might be very specific while a rule that substitutes for it might 
be vague. Id. 
 61 See SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 112–13. 
 62 Id. at 112. 
 63 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-852 (1989) (“Irrespective of the maxi-
mum speeds permitted by law, any person who drives a vehicle on any highway 
recklessly or at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger the life, limb, or prop-
erty of any person shall be guilty of reckless driving.”). 
 64 Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 543; see also SCHAUER, supra note 
31, at 162–66. 
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will be applying the rule in a particular case.65 They do this, in 
large part, by excluding from consideration factors (such as the 
safety of driving over twenty-five miles per hour) that the adjudi-
cator might otherwise find relevant.66 As Schauer explains, rules 
provide a reason for compliance that is independent from the poli-
cies they seek to further—indeed that is the very nature of a 
“rule.”67 
Schauer thus justifies rules not only on their ability to generate 
better outcomes, which can happen if rule-makers make systemati-
cally better decisions than adjudicators would acting alone,68 but 
also on their ability to allow allocations of power among the insti-
tutions of government.69 Under Schauer’s understanding of the 
value of rules, the correct way to evaluate formalism is not neces-
sarily whether it is more deterministic or leads to better out-
comes—but rather it is whether one can defend a practice in which 
rule authors (legislators) allocate power to themselves and away 
from adjudicators (judges) who will apply the law to particular 
cases.70 
In his theory of rule-based decision-making, Schauer has much 
in common with Justice Scalia, whose formalism was committed to 
 
 65 See Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 538; SCHAUER, supra note 31, 
at 158. 
 66 Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 544 (“Part of what formalism is 
about is its inculcation of the view that sometimes it is appropriate for deci-
sionmakers to recognize their lack of jurisdiction and to defer even when they 
are convinced that their own judgment is best.”). 
 67 SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 112 (“When the existence of an instantiation 
adds normative weight beyond that supplied by its underlying substantive justi-
fications, the instantiation has the status of a rule.”). 
 68 Id. at 151–54. 
 69 See id. at 158. Summers drew a similar distinction in his discussion of 
formality, distinguishing between first-level policy goals (to control behavior in 
a desired way) and second-level rationales for formality (to allocate discretion 
away from officials or to increase the clarity and, hence, the reliability of sub-
stantive rules of law). Summers, supra note 44, at 247–48. 
 70 SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 214; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role 
of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65 
(1988) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Original Intent] (“Congress may think the costs 
of rules less than the combined costs of vagueness and the risk that courts will 
set off in the direction the law points without seeing the stopping point.”). 
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constraining the discretion of judges.71 His defenses of textualism 
and originalism were closely aligned to his defense of rules; in The 
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, Scalia defended both originalism 
and textualism for their ability to supply the “raw material” for 
rule-based decision-making.72 But Scalia’s defense of textualism 
and originalism was more explicitly institutionalist than Schauer’s: 
First, Schauer justifies rules both on their ability to generate better 
outcomes and their ability to allocate power73 while Scalia concen-
trated solely on the their power-allocating function.74 Although 
many of his critics considered his formalism to be grounded in 
ideological conservativism,75 Scalia himself justified his formalism 
(both textualism and originalism) on institutional rather than em-
pirical or instrumental grounds.76 Second, Scalia’s justification for 
formalism emphasized dangers presented not only by appliers of 
rules but also by their authors.77 Scalia’s formalism sought to con-
 
 71 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1175, 1182–84 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Rule of Law]; Solum, supra note 
15, at 2494; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: 
Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 33 (1994) (“The turn-of-the-century 
formalists and their current heirs maintain that the Court has a single goal: de-
claring and enforcing the rule of law.”). 
 72 Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 71, at 1184 (“Just as that manner of tex-
tual exegesis facilitates the formulation of general rules, so does, in the constitu-
tional field, adherence to a more or less originalist theory of construction. The 
raw material for the general rule is readily apparent.”); see also Solum, supra 
note 15, at 2494. 
 73 See generally SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 158–59, 229–233 
 74 See Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 71, at 1176. 
 75 E.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, Balanced Realism on Judging, 44 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 1243, 1257 (2010) (“The suspicion that politics is what drives charges of 
‘formalism’ is heightened when one recognizes that the jurists most often con-
demned as formalists were usually conservatives of some stripe . . . .”); 
Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 16, at 410 (“Formalism . . . embodies a rela-
tively antigovernmental philosophy. This may reflect the libertarian bias of 
some formalists . . . .”). 
 76 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 
849, 862 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Originalism]; see also John F. Manning, 
Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 685, 688–
89 (1999) (distinguishing among various constitutional values that formalism 
might reflect). 
 77 Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 71, at 1176; Scalia, Common-Law Courts, 
supra note 11, at 17. 
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strain drafters by requiring them to exercise control in readily iden-
tifiable forms (text).78 
3. RULES AND FORMS OF RULES 
But rules and form are not the same thing, and there is consid-
erable daylight between Schauer’s account of rule-based decision-
making79 and Scalia’s formalism; “formalism,” even in common 
rather than legal usage is a “strict or excessive adherence to pre-
scribed forms”80 not “a strict or excessive adherence to rules.”81 
 
 78 See Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 71, at 1176; Scalia, Common-Law 
Courts, supra note 11, at 17–18; Scalia, Originalism, supra note 54, at 863. 
Scalia thought textualism could simultaneously require legislatures to state rules 
clearly (to avoid “Nero’s trick” of posting laws high on pillars where they could 
not be read) and prevent judges from substituting their own preferences in the 
service of discerning unstated legislative intent. Scalia, Common-Law Courts, 
supra note 11, at 17–18; see also John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelega-
tion Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997) (describing limits that textualism 
imposes on Congress). 
 79 Various modern anti-formalist critiques of formalism, from modern real-
ism, to critical legal studies, to attitudinal theories of judicial decision-making 
share that critical view of formalism as predicated on law as an autonomous 
system. Solum, supra note 15, at 2465–66. If formalism represents decision by 
rule, then modern formalism, like conceptual formalism, is predicated on the 
existence of law as an autonomous system. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Stat-
utes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 438 (1989) (“This is, at 
bottom, a formalist position—formalist because it sees the process as entirely 
autonomous and free from value-laden inquiries.”). These critiques of formalism 
that invalidly depend on the autonomy of law are, like criticisms of determinacy, 
leveled not at formalism itself but rather at the existence of a settled meaning of 
law regardless of one’s method for determining that meaning. Thus, my answer 
to the criticism from autonomy is the same as my answer to the criticism from 
determinism: it represents a confusion between conceptualist orthodoxy and 
modern formalism, which is a method for determining the meaning of law but 
does not itself posit that law has a single, unsettled meaning. Indeed, modern 
formalism is predicated on exactly the opposite supposition, as evidenced by the 
formalist rejection of intentionalism discussed immediately below. 
 80 Frederick Schauer, Formalism: Legal, Constitutional, Judicial, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 428 (Keith E. Whittington et al. 
eds., 2008) [hereinafter Schauer, OXFORD HANDBOOK] (emphasis added) (quot-
ing 6 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 83 (R.W. Burchfield ed., 2d ed., 
1989)). 
 81 Thus, I would distinguish formalism itself from so-called “rule formal-
ism,” which is the term frequently used to describe rule-based approaches like 
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Form certainly mattered to Justice Scalia, who justified textualism 
and originalism based on a commitment to shifting power from 
judges toward legislatures but rejected attempts to determine the 
intent of the legislatures he was attempting to empower: Scalia’s 
originalism was textual, and he attacked so-called “intentionalism” 
(even intentionalism as to the meaning of rules) as threatening to 
democracy because it ignores the need for legislative will to appear 
in an objectively expressed form.82 Similar concerns underlie the 
formalism of Frank Easterbrook, who attacks legislative intent (if 
such a thing could even exist) as irrelevant because the nature of 
the legislative process (aconceptual as it is) requires agreement, 
which arrives not in the form of an understood intent but rather as 
a text.83 
Both textualism and originalism are methodologies predicated 
on analysis of law according to its form. Form itself matters to tex-
tualists and originalists because, in their view (given the available 
alternatives), text (in either its plain or original meaning) is the 
only form that can serve the dual purpose of adequately constrain-
ing both legislators and the judges who will be applying the law in 
particular cases.84 
 
Schauer’s. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Ar-
rows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic 
Politics, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2121, 2157 n.97 (1999) (describing a rule-based 
approach as “rule formalism”); cf. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Combination of 
Formalism and Realism 1 (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Sch. of L. Working Paper, 
Paper No. 17-03-01, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2929038 [hereinafter Tamanaha, Combination] (distinguishing types of for-
malism between “conceptual formalism” and “rule formalism”). My point is that 
“rule formalism” doesn’t adequately capture modern formalist approaches be-
cause it does not depend on form. 
 82 Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 11, at 17 (arguing that it is 
wrong “to have the meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, 
rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated”). 
 83 Easterbrook, Original Intent, supra note 70, at 63 (“[T]the original intent 
approach to legislation ignores the fact that laws are born of compromise. Dif-
ferent designs pull in different directions.”). That decidedly formalist sentiment 
was shared by the realist Oliver Wendell Holmes, who similarly rejected legisla-
tive intent as a guide to statutory interpretation. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The 
Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899). 
 84 See, e.g., Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 71, at 1176–77; Scalia, Com-
mon-Law Courts, supra note 11, at 17–18. 
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In many ways, though, formalism’s connection to textualism 
and originalism is part of the problem. As described below, formal-
ism is not synonymous with either textualism or originalism, but 
much of the modern confusion over the meaning of formalism is 
the result of the term’s use by both sides in debates over the merits 
of textualism and originalism.85 Part of understanding formalism is 
to separate it from those debates without denying its connection to 
both methodologies. 
4. RULES, FORMS, AND LEGAL MEANING 
Formalism goes beyond the ability to identify the law; it in-
forms our understanding of the substance of the law. It is possible 
for rules to be understood in a variety of forms. Thus, to borrow 
Hart’s example (expanded upon by Schauer), suppose a “rule” 
against wearing hats in church.86 That rule may appear to different 
people in different forms. One person may simply observe that 
others are removing their hats on entering the church and do so 
themself so as not to stand out. Another may have studied the par-
ticular religion and know that the religion considers it disrespectful 
to hide one’s head from God (while knowing that other religions 
consider it disrespectful not to). A third person, a child coming in 
from a baseball game, may simply be told by an adult to remove 
their hat when coming into the church without further explanation. 
All three individuals experience the hat-removal rule as a “rule” in 
Schauer’s terms in that the instantiation of the rule displaces its 
underlying justification87—the person removes their hat because of 
the rule even if they do not believe wearing a hat is in fact disre-
spectful to God. 
If a rule can be expressed in many forms, the question is 
whether the form of the rule matters apart from the content of the 
rule—whether the form of the rule has significance independent 
from the content of the rule it expresses. The answer to that ques-
tion seems self-evidently “yes.” The hat doffer who seeks to avoid 
embarrassment, the religious scholar, and the admonished child all 
understand very different rules by virtue of the way they came to 
 
 85 See infra Part I.B.3. 
 86 HART, supra note 2, at 124–26; SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 69–72. 
 87 SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 112. 
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learn the content of the rule—by the form of the rule they experi-
enced.88 The form in which a rule is expressed might affect how 
closely people conform their behavior to the rule (I might be more 
(or less) likely to slow down based on a speed limit sign than based 
on a suggestion from a billboard), but the form of a rule might car-
ry meaning beyond its ability to generate compliance; it might send 
a message about the social meaning of conduct by virtue of how it 
subjects that conduct to law.89 
Understanding “formalism” as an approach to law that consid-
ers form might seem obvious, but the meaning of “formalism” has 
been clouded by its use on both sides of a series of arguments 
about law.90 In order to clear those clouds, it is necessary to revisit 
the various ways formalism was used in the twentieth century be-
fore we can free formalism to fulfill its potential in the twenty-first 
century. 
B. Twentieth Century Formalism 
In many ways, the battle over formalism was the defining legal 
controversy of the twentieth century.91 The early twentieth century 
saw the rise of realism, which was a direct assault on the formal-
 
 88 From this perspective, Schauer’s rule-based decision-making seems not 
particularly formalist, since rules might be applied in a more or less rule-like 
fashion without regard to their particular form, and Schauer came to rely less on 
formalism as his theory of rules developed. Although Schauer launched his theo-
ry of rule-based decision-making as a defense of formalism, the connection to 
formalism is more attenuated in Schauer’s later work on rule-based decision-
making. In Formalism itself, Schauer first defined his approach as “presumptive 
formalism” before switching the label at the end of the paper to “presumptive 
positivism.” See Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 546, 548. In the later 
Playing by the Rules, Schauer completed the move he began in Formalism, 
shifting his emphasis away from formalism and toward a positivist approach to 
law. Compare id. at 546 with SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 196 (featuring term 
“presumptive positivism”). 
 89 See infra Part III. 
 90 See TAMANAHA, supra note 23, at 1–3 (describing history of academic 
debates between formalists and realists). 
 91 See Pierre Schlag, Formalism and Realism in Ruins (Mapping the Logics 
of Collapse), 95 IOWA L. REV. 195, 197 (2009) (“Of all the great disputes that 
have marked American law, formalism vs. realism might well be among the 
most pervasive and significant.”). 
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ism exhibited by the Langdellian orthodoxy that had preceded it, 
and many developments in law over this period could be seen as a 
rejection of formalist approaches.92 Any number of developments, 
from the rejection of the separate-but-equal doctrine of Plessy v. 
Ferguson93 to the practical approach to education that the Court 
took in Brown v. Board of Education,94 could be described as the 
triumph of realism over formalism. In the late twentieth century, 
formalism became embroiled in a second battle, this time over the 
rise of textualism95 and originalism96 as the dominant methodolo-
gies of legal interpretation. I will address this historical divide be-
tween early and late twentieth century battles over formalism, de-
scribing first the realist critique of the orthodoxy before discussing 
the modern understanding of formalism, an understanding held 
largely by critics, many of whom are methodologically united only 
in their criticism of formalism (a group I refer to collectively as 
“anti-formalists”97). To find formalism, we must consider formal-
ism for what it is, not the most contentious ways in which it is 
used. 
1. THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE “CLASSICAL 
ORTHODOXY” AND THE REALIST RESPONSE 
In American law, the first half of the twentieth century was 
marked by the rise of legal realism, and with it the demise of its 
primary intellectual rival: so-called “legal formalism.”98 But label-
 
 92 TAMANAHA, supra note 23, at 2. 
 93 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 94 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 95 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-
Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 
VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1995) (“[C]onsistent with its interest in textualism as 
its dominant interpretive methodology, the current Court emphasizes clear 
statement rules much more than presumptions.”). 
 96 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 245 (1995) (“The 
dominant rhetoric of judges . . . is originalist, for originalism is the legal profes-
sion’s orthodox mode of justification.”). 
 97 Cf. Sunstein, Empirically, supra note 4, at 639 (grouping various ap-
proaches opposed to formalism as “antiformalist”). 
 98 See generally TAMANAHA, supra note 23, at 1–3; Schlag, supra note 91, 
at 201–04; cf. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 35–39 
(1960) (distinguishing between the “formal” style and its predecessor, the 
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ing the opposite of realism as “formalism” is itself largely a mod-
ern habit;99 contemporary uses of “formalism” or “formalist” were 
less frequent.100 The focus of the realist criticism was not “formal-
ism” per se but rather a concept of law as complete, logically or-
dered, and objectively determinable;101 a conception of the com-
pleteness of law that has been alternatively (and occasionally col-
lectively) associated with the classical positivism of Jeremy Ben-
tham and John Austin;102 and “analytical jurisprudence”103—what 
Thomas Grey labeled the “classical orthodoxy”: a conception of 
law inseparably identified with Dean Christopher Columbus Lang-
dell.104 Although formalism has, in modern times, been generally 
identified with this complete conception of law,105 formalism was 
merely one component of it; Langdell’s orthodoxy was much big-
ger than “formalism.”106 As Grey points out, Langdell’s universal-
 
“grand” style); Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 
COLUM. L. REV. 431, 447 n.12 (1930). 
 99 E.g., Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
1138, 1145–46 (1999) (book review) [hereinafter Leiter, Positivism] (“[W]e 
may characterize formalism as the descriptive theory of adjudication according 
to which (1) the law is rationally determinate, and (2) judging is mechanical. It 
follows, moreover, from (1), that (3) legal reasoning is autonomous, since the 
class of legal reasons suffices to justify a unique outcome; no recourse to non-
legal reasons is demanded or required.”). 
 100 See, e.g., Pound, supra note 1, at 607–08 (attacking formalistic ideas as 
“mechanical jurisprudence” without using term formalism or formalist). 
 101 Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 608–09 
(1999) [hereinafter Pildes, Forms of Formalism] (“To the classical formalists, 
law meant more: it meant a scientific system of rules and institutions that were 
complete in that the system made right answers available in all cases; formal in 
that right answers could be derived from the autonomous, logical working out of 
the system; conceptually ordered in that ground-level rules could all be derived 
from a few fundamental principles; and socially acceptable in that the legal 
system generated normative allegiance.”). 
 102 ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 
23, 30–32 (1998). 
 103 Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2054, 
2068–72 (1995). 
 104 Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 2–3 
(1983). 
 105 See, e.g., Pildes, Forms of Formalism, supra note 101, at 608–09; Leiter, 
Positivism, supra note 99, at 1145–46. 
 106 See Grey, supra note 104, at 6. 
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ist picture of law encompassed not only formalism but other essen-
tial components: comprehensiveness, completeness, conceptual 
order, and acceptability.107 
With Grey’s more careful parsing of the classical orthodoxy, 
this “formalism” takes on a more specific meaning: a method for 
describing the connection between a principle and its application in 
an objective and logical fashion—a procedural approach to deriv-
ing meaning.108 Adherents to the classical orthodoxy borrowed 
concepts like formality from mathematical reasoning, likening law 
to geometry, in which principles and formal reasoning were com-
bined with physical observation to discover objective truth.109 
Formalism was a distinct part of the orthodoxy and could exist in a 
system that lacked other attributes of the classical orthodoxy, such 
as completeness or autonomy110 (Richard Posner, for instance, fre-
quently employs elements of formal reasoning111 while denying 
that law is autonomous112). Formalism was, therefore, merely one 
 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at 8 (“A legal system is formal to the extent that its outcomes are dic-
tated by demonstrative (rationally compelling) reasoning.”). 
 109 See id. at 19. 
 110 Cf. Leiter, Positivism, supra note 99, at 1150–51 (describing formalism as 
a theory of adjudication existing independently from any particular theory about 
nature or source of law). 
 111 See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 
593 (7th Cir. 1986) ( writing for majority, Judge Posner explained that a prelim-
inary injunction could only be granted if “P x Hp > (1 – P) x Hd”). 
 112 See Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Disci-
pline: 1962–1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 761–62 (1987); see also Smith, su-
pra note 5, at 425 (“Posner’s efforts to make law more scientific and his well-
known attempts to resolve a multitude of legal problems and to unify numerous 
and diverse areas of law within the regime of law and economics are arguably 
instances—indeed, extreme instances—of formalist thinking.” (footnotes omit-
ted)); David A. Strauss, The Anti-Formalist, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1885, 1886 
(2007) (“Some might say that Posner’s economic analysis of legal issues does 
sometimes succumb to the ‘lure of scientific order,’ simplifying problems exces-
sively so that they can be analyzed with the tools of economics. However true 
that may be, Posner, as a judge, is one of the great anti-formalists of our time.”). 
Approaches like Posner’s have led some to conflate social-science driven ap-
proaches with textualism, labeling both as different kinds of “formalism” when 
the two could not be more distinct. See Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, A 
Tale of Two Formalisms, 106 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript 
at 4) (electronic copy available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=3553508) (“[Law and 
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part of the classical orthodoxy, which encompassed other equally 
(if not more) contestable claims about law, such as its coherence 
and autonomy.113  
But the converse was not true; the Langdellian vision was not 
constructed out of methods or concepts that could be applied in 
other areas.114 The orthodoxy was specific to the common law.115 
The formalism (as in the procedural approach to deriving meaning) 
of the model was itself dependent on the existence of the concep-
tual ordering of a system like that of the common law.116 Followers 
of the classical orthodoxy did not argue that statutes could be pro-
cedurally interpreted using formalism; the components of the or-
thodoxy were specific to inquiry into the common law and did not 
exist outside of it.117 
Formalism in the sense of objective reasoning may have been 
part of Langdell’s admittedly problematic vision of law, but it was 
a relatively minor component along with others, most especially 
conceptualism: the idea that the law applicable in a particular case 
could be derived from fundamental principles118 (a claim that itself 
implied the autonomy of law since being able to determine the law 
from a few principles meant that there was no need for recourse to 
information other than those principles119). When Hart criticized 
formalism, he did so by attacking conceptualism in both label and 
substance:  
When the unenvisaged case does arise, we confront 
the issues at stake and can then settle the question 
by choosing between the competing interests in the 
 
economics] is economic formalism. [Originalism and textualism] is legal for-
malism.”). 
 113 See Grey, supra note 104, at 6. 
 114 See generally id. at 2, 5–6. 
 115 See id. at 19. 
 116 See id. at 8–9; 40–41. 
 117 Id. at 34. 
 118 Id. at 8. 
 119 Weinrib, supra note 8, at 951–52. Weinrib posits that conceptualist for-
malism sought to reject the distinction between concept and form exhibited by 
most concepts (such as tables) by insisting that the tools for understanding law 
must come from law itself—in other words, “the internal intelligibility of law.” 
Id. at 961–62. 
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way which best satisfies us . . . . The vice known to 
legal theory as formalism or conceptualism consists 
in an attitude to verbally formulated rules which 
both seeks to disguise and to minimize the need for 
such choice, once the general rule has been laid 
down.120 
The enterprise of the realists, led by Pound, Karl Llewellyn, 
and Oliver Wendell Holmes, was to dismantle the classical ortho-
doxy, which they found theoretically unsatisfactory and practically 
unworkable.121 When one considers the combination of claims up-
on which the classical orthodoxy depended, its eventual demise 
seems almost inevitable. It is of course impossible to envision a 
comprehensive (which is to say gapless), complete (and hence au-
tonomous), objectively logical, and socially acceptable legal sys-
tem in practice; too many legal questions are contested to permit 
anyone to seriously believe that such a system exists. The realist 
enterprise was negative—the classical orthodoxy was the “indis-
pensable foil, the parental dogma that shapes the heretical growth 
of a rebellious offspring.”122 The strict requirements of conceptual-
ism made the realist’s deconstructive enterprise an easy one, since 
establishing any gaps or inconsistency would undermine the abso-
lute claim upon which such a system must rest.123 Attacking for-
mality itself was even easier, since what is objectively determina-
ble to one is not necessarily objectively determinable to another; 
Langdell himself was convinced that the fundamental principles of 
contract law could be objectively applied to conclude that ac-
ceptance of an offer be effective only on receipt of the acceptance 
 
 120 HART, supra note 2, at 129. 
 121 See Grey, supra note 104, at 49. 
 122 Id. at 3; Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 
465, 476 (1988) (“Realism was a reaction against classical legal thought . . . .”). 
 123 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652, 
653–54 (1873). See generally DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 23 (1996) 
(“The plausibility of the formalist enterprise depends upon the success of its 
metaphysical claims, specifically that law has a conceptual and normative struc-
ture independent of the play of external, usually political, interests.”). 
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by the offeror,124 and yet courts have largely reached a different 
conclusion.125 
Of course, many of these points of criticism were strawmen—
it’s not clear that anyone ever held the most contentious of these 
views.126 The orthodoxy itself was an aspirational, not a descrip-
tive, claim.127 The criticism from determinacy was particularly 
misplaced, since the requirements of conceptualism were applica-
ble not to the outcomes of particular cases but rather to the princi-
ples themselves; inconsistent outcomes in specific cases weren’t 
really a demonstration of the failure of the system at all.128 Wheth-
er the criticism from determinacy was a fair one or not, it is clear 
that realism won, or at least that the orthodoxy lost. There are no 
serious adherents to Langdellian conceptualist formalism today.129 
2. FORMALISM AND LOCHNERISM 
As Fred Schauer has pointed out, the Oxford English Diction-
ary defines “formalism” as “strict or excessive adherence to pre-
scribed forms,”130 and even today the term is frequently used to 
describe an excessive degree of rigidity,131 which is the sense in 
 
 124 See Grey, supra note 104, at 3–4. 
 125 See, e.g., Adams v. Lindsell, 1 B. & Ald. 681–82 (K.B. 1818). 
 126 See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Mounting Evidence Against the “Formalist 
Age,” 92 TEX. L. REV. 1667, 1679–83 (2014) [hereinafter Tamanaha, Formalist 
Age] (discussing problems with Pound’s account of formalism and resulting 
confusion). 
 127 Grey, supra note 104, at 13. 
 128 Weinrib, supra note 8, at 1009. 
 129 See Smith, supra note 5, at 427 (“Does anyone today contend that law is 
‘a body of immutable principles’?” (quoting Posner, supra note 6, at 1656)). 
Even those who ascribe to a conceptualist formalism have a far more limited 
view of the power of conceptualism. See ALLAN BEEVER, FORGOTTEN JUSTICE 
243–44 (2013). 
 130 Schauer, OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 428 (emphasis added) 
(quoting OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 80, at 83). 
 131 E.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law 
Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 
712 (1991) (describing “rigid, rule-like deductivism associated with formal-
ism”); Golove, supra note 16, at 1796 (describing the “the rigid, unconvincing 
character of [Justice Scalia’s] formalistic interpretive methodology”); Ofer Ra-
ban, Between Formalism and Conservatism: The Resurgent Legal Formalism of 
the Roberts Court, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 343, 345 (2014) (describing formal-
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which Scalia himself invoked it as a term of opprobrium in his dis-
sent in Oregon v. Ice.132 
The attack on formalism as rigidity is particularly unfair, since 
the existence of a commitment and the degree of that commitment 
are distinct. One could have a rigid commitment to formalism or a 
flexible one, in the same way one could be a committed pragmatist 
(for instance, by devaluing a statute’s text if it works a result in-
consistent with received intent or socially optimal outcomes) or a 
flexible one (by using practical considerations only in cases of tex-
tual ambiguity).133 The view of formalism as rigidity is held exclu-
sively by its critics134 (I have found no one brave enough to argue 
that one should apply the law with excessive rigidity), and so it 
would be easy to ignore the equation of formalism with rigidity as 
no more than an attempt to overstate the claims of formalism in 
order to make them easier to attack—much like the realist critique 
of Langdellian determinism135—but for the widespread popularity 
of this view.136 Although this view is held in modern times, it de-
serves treatment as part of the early twentieth century battles over 
formalism because of its close association with the supremely un-
popular decision in Lochner v. New York.137 
 
ism as “strict adherence to a rigid rule, coupled with a refusal to consider the 
merit of a possible exception”); cf. Summers, supra note 44, at 244 (“Americans 
frequently threw the baby—formality, out with the bath water—excessive for-
mality.”). 
 132 See Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 173–78 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
infra note 198. 
 133 Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formal-
ism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 559 (1992) [hereinafter Farber, 
Inevitability]; Sunstein, Empirically, supra note 4, at 640 (“The real question is 
‘what degree of formalism?’ rather than ‘formalist or not?’”). 
 134 See, e.g., supra note 129. 
 135 See Grey, supra note 104, at 49; Tamanaha, Formalist Age, supra note 
126, at 1679–83. 
 136 See supra note 129. 
 137 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see J.M. Balkin, Some Real-
ism about Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 
DUKE L.J. 375, 400 (discussing what “a Lochner-era formalist might argue”); 
Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 511 (“Few decisions are charged with 
formalism as often as Lochner v. New York.”); Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest 
Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 
941, 972 (1999) (“The prevailing wisdom today is that Lochner-era jurispru-
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Attempting to rescue formalism from its cursed association 
with Lochner, Schauer himself has explained that Lochner is actu-
ally “false formalism” in the sense that the Court’s formalistic 
treatment of the “liberty” question in the case was actually a de-
ceptive use of formalism; the Court in Lochner hid the true, con-
tingent basis for the decision in a falsely deterministic one.138 I 
would make that claim in even stronger terms: Lochner was not 
“false formalism” because it was not formalist at all. 
Any number of cases could be pointed to as examples of judges 
deciding cases on highly controversial grounds while attributing 
the outcome to another seemingly more deterministic one. As I 
have written elsewhere, Justice Brennan employed exactly that 
approach in United States Department of Agriculture v. More-
no139—a case in which he intended to apply a fundamental rights 
approach but turned to the false objectivity of rationality when that 
strategy failed.140 No one would consider Moreno to be a formalist 
application of the rational basis test, even if it was a falsely deter-
ministic one, and I think the same is true of Lochner. Lochner may 
be deceptively deterministic, but it is a mistake to label all decep-
tively deterministic cases “formalist” or “formalistic.”141 
My point of disagreement with Schauer’s characterization of 
Lochner comes with his claim that the choice made by the Court 
 
dence was rigidly formalistic.”); see also David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New 
York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1469, 1504, n.228 (2005) 
(collecting citations to Lochner as formalist). 
 138 Schauer, OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 428–29. 
 139 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
 140 Thomas B. Nachbar, Rational Basis “Plus”, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 449, 
450–51 (2017). 
 141 Schauer, OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 429–30; cf. Lyrissa Bar-
nett Lidsky, Defensor Fidei: The Travails of a Post-Realist Formalist, 47 FLA. 
L. REV. 815, 821 n. 41 (1995) (“Perhaps, however, it is unfair to keep bringing 
up Lochner to challenge the formalist account of legal reasoning. Justice Peck-
ham’s error was not that he was a formalist; it was that he was formalistic.”). 
Lidsky, too, was attempting to rescue formalism from the tarred brush of Loch-
ner, but it’s not clear that the “ic” of “formalistic” can do that much work. Dic-
tionaries tend to indiscriminately define both “formalistic” and “formalist” an 
adjectival forms of “formalism.” See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra 
note 80, at 83 (defining these terms). 
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was “masked by the language of linguistic inexorability,”142 by 
which he suggests a false textualism.143 That view has a solid pedi-
gree; Holmes’s famous dissent in Lochner accuses it of being for-
malist through his citation to the compass of “liberty”144 (the textu-
al basis of Peckham’s opinion145). But a textual connection does 
not formalism make—if it did, then any equal protection case strik-
ing a law as inconsistent with “equal protection of the laws” would 
also deserve to be called formalist.146 
As it happens, Lochner was not a particularly textualist deci-
sion. Although ostensibly protecting the “liberty” of the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Lochner decision 
did not hold that the restraint at issue (a working hours limitation) 
was categorically unconstitutional because it was inconsistent with 
a fixed understanding of the word “liberty” but rather that the par-
ticular regulation at issue (one applied only to bakers) was “unrea-
 
 142 Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 512. 
 143 Schauer’s criticism of Lochner’s “linguistic inexorability” raises a ques-
tion about which form of formalism he is applying. Textualism is more a prod-
uct of modern understandings of formalism than the conceptualist formalism 
attributed to Langdell, see supra Part I.A.3., although both are equally open to 
charges of (false) determinacy. 
 144 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I 
think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is 
held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion.”); see, e.g., Sunstein, 
On Analogical Reasoning, supra note 3, at 756 (“Consider, for example, the 
view that the liberty to contract is necessarily, and purely as a matter of seman-
tics, part of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause.” (citing Lochner, 
198 U.S. at 53)). 
 145 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 (“The general right to make a contract in relation 
to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”). 
 146 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. If anything, it is Holmes, not Peckham, 
who was the better formalist in 1905. Holmes’s condemnation of the majority’s 
reliance on “an economic theory which a large part of the country does not en-
tertain” and “Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics” is a claim that the Court was 
importing non-legal materials into its consideration of a legal question, which 
would have been a violation of Langdellian conceptualist formalism. See Loch-
ner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). See generally DUXBURY, supra note 
24, at 45-46 (describing broader implications of Holmes’s Lochner dissent for 
use of outside sources).  
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sonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary.”147 The discussion of “liberty” 
in Justice Peckham’s decision is literally conditional: “Both prop-
erty and liberty are held on such reasonable conditions as may be 
imposed by the governing power of the State in the exercise of 
those powers, and with such conditions the Fourteenth Amendment 
was not designed to interfere,”148 and nowhere does Peckham sug-
gest that separating unreasonable conditions from reasonable ones 
was a textual enterprise.149 Nor was the case solely focused on the 
word “liberty.”150 The Lochner Court pointed to a variety of prob-
lems well outside of textualism, including a concern that the legis-
lature had dissembled with regard to its legislative purpose,151 a 
decidedly non-formalist approach. 
Even if one believes the Lochner majority was being deceptive, 
it is difficult to see how they were being deceptive in a formalist 
way, and so it is little surprise that the formalist argument for 
Lochner was made primarily by opponents rather than friends of 
either formalism or Lochner.152 Indeed, Langdell and his followers 
did not think that conceptualist formalism, which was a creature of 
private law, could be applied to constitutional law at all.153 Thomas 
Grey posits that the association between Lochnerism and formal-
 
 147 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56 (citing standard: “an unreasonable, unnecessary 
and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liber-
ty”); see Paul N. Cox, An Interpretation and (Partial) Defense of Legal Formal-
ism, 36 IND. L. REV. 57, 95 (2003) (“Lochner is not in fact an example of a for-
malist mode of adjudication; it is an example of the use of a balancing test, albe-
it one employed in service of a laissez faire agenda.”). 
 148 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 (emphasis added). 
 149 Id. at 52–64. 
 150 See id. 
 151 Id. at 64 (“It is manifest to us that the limitation of the hours of labor as 
provided for in this section of the statute under which the indictment was found, 
and the plaintiff in error convicted, has no such direct relation to, and no such 
substantial effect upon the health of the employ[ee], as to justify us in regarding 
the section as really a health law. It seems to us that the real object and purpose 
were simply to regulate the hours of labor between the master and his em-
ploy[ees] (all being men, sui juris), in a private business, not dangerous in any 
degree to morals, or in any real and substantial degree, to the health of the em-
ployés.”). 
 152 See David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 
18 n.87 (2003). 
 153 See Grey, supra note 104, at 34. 
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ism was drawn by Progressives, who confused the social economic 
conservatism of Lochnerism with conceptualist formalism (whose 
conservatism was doctrinal rather than economic),154 and in recent 
years, the view of Lochner as formalist has come under considera-
ble scrutiny.155 
When considered as part of the series of cases—some uphold-
ing limitations and others striking them—throughout the period, 
Lochner is better viewed as an understandably controversial appli-
cation of the Court’s far-from-formalist “police powers” jurispru-
dence.156 Lochner may have been a misapplication of the doctrine, 
but neither the doctrine itself nor Lochner’s application of it was 
formalist. Even if one equates formalism with rigidity rather than 
deception, the police-powers doctrine would have been a poor can-
didate for a formalistic approach; it was acknowledged by the 
Court to be an open-ended inquiry.157 The Court itself was keenly 
aware of its inability to define the scope of the police power,158 and 
neither courts nor commentators ever made the kind of conceptual-
 
 154 See DUXBURY, supra note 24, at 25 (“The second strand of legal formal-
ism . . . —the tradition of laissez faire—was not a product of the academy; this 
was, rather, a product of the courts.”); Grey, supra note 104, at 39 (“Progressive 
and later New Deal lawyers saw classical orthodoxy as a form of conservative 
ideology. In part this was a confusion of Langdellian legal science with the lais-
sez-faire constitutional doctrines epitomized by the Lochner decision.”); Singer, 
supra note 122, at 478 (“In contrast, legal theorists in the classical period (1860-
1940) tried to separate strictly the private sphere of individual contractual free-
dom from the public sphere of government regulation.”); see also Thomas C. 
Grey, Judicial Review and Legal Pragmatism, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 473, 
477 (2003) (“The joinder of Langdellian private law theory and Lochner-type 
public law to create a single impressive target—the Demon of Formalism—was 
a creative act on the part of Holmes and his followers among the early modern 
American legal thinkers.”). 
 155 See Grey, supra note 104, at 39; see also Bernstein, supra note 152, at 18 
n.87 (collecting sources); Cox, supra note 147, at 95 n.166 (same). 
 156 See Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85 
B.U. L. REV. 881, 885–95 (2005); Thomas B. Nachbar, The Rationality of Ra-
tional Basis Review, 102 VA. L. REV. 1627, 1639–41 (2016). 
 157 Nachbar, supra note 156, at 1644–45. 
 158 See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62 (1873) (“This 
is called the police power; and it is declared by Chief Justice Shaw that it is 
much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of it than to mark 
its boundaries, or prescribe limits to its exercise.”). 
2020] TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FORMALISM 145 
 
ist deterministic claims about the scope of the police power that 
some would have attributed to the legal formalism of the day.159 
Indeed, if the police powers doctrine had a particular advantage, it 
was that it required the Court to take responsibility for making the 
choices it did in due process and equal protection cases without 
being able to ascribe outcomes to a purportedly objective ra-
tionale160 in the way that many claim the Lochner Court did.161 
3. THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY: TEXTUALISM, 
ORIGINALISM, AND THE ANTI-FORMALISTS 
Although many modern scholars are united in their disdain for 
formalism, they share less agreement on its definition. For some, 
like Martha Nussbaum and Henry Smith, formalism is a narrow162 
or even wrongheaded163 approach to legal thinking. Others follow 
Pound in considering it the mechanical,164 rigid,165 slavish,166 or 
 
 159 See Nachbar, supra note 156, at 1644–47. 
 160 Id. at 1680–81. 
 161 See, e.g., Lidsky, supra note 141, at 821 n.41 (“Justice Peckham’s opin-
ion in Lochner . . . is actually an extreme version of the formalist faith in the 
mechanical deducibility of results from rules.”). 
 162 Martha Nussbaum, Foreword: Constitutions and Capabilities: “Percep-
tion” Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 62 (2007) (describing a 
case as demonstrating “why judges should not hold too narrow, or too formalis-
tic, a conception of their role”). 
 163 Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 
90 VA. L. REV. 965, 1034 (2004) (describing a decision as “wrongheaded for-
malistic reasoning leading to economic waste”). 
 164 Pound, supra note 1, at 608 (describing “mechanical jurisprudence”); 
Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 875, 878–79 (2003) [hereinafter Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy] (explaining 
that under realist view of formalism, “judges mechanically apply a disembodied 
entity called ‘The Law’”). 
 165 Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered the Common Law: The Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 
945 (1987) (decrying “the formalism of the common law writ system and its 
rigid and inflexible procedural steps”). 
 166 Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Bogus Tale About the Legal Formalists 3 (St. 
John’s Univ. Legal Studs. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-0130, 2008), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1123498 (discussing at-
tacks labelling formalism as “a slavish adherence to rules contrary to good 
sense”). 
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even intellectually dishonest167 application of rules.168 For still oth-
ers, like Posner, it represents a simplistic and deductive approach 
to law.169 
It is also common to pair “formalistic” and “formulaic,”170 per-
haps encouraged by Roscoe Pound’s famous description of the 
formalist component of conceptualist formalism as “mechanical 
jurisprudence,”171 which signaled the decline of a scientifically 
 
 167 Singer, supra note 122, at 520 (“[I]t would be disingenuous—it would be 
formalist—to claim that one set of principles emerged from the original posi-
tion.”); David A. Strauss, The Role of a Bill of Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 539, 
547 (1992) [hereinafter Strauss, Bill of Rights] (“Even if the formalist approach 
would be more effective, however, it might still be unacceptably disingenu-
ous.”). 
 168 Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Struc-
tural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 521 (2001) (describing “the tendency 
of a rule-enforcement system to create separate, formalistic procedures that dis-
courage problem solving”); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in 
Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1673 (2003) (discussing Jay Thomas’s con-
clusion that “the unifying theme in Federal Circuit jurisprudence over the last 
ten years is a shift toward simple rules and legal formalism”). Scholars are hard-
ly alone in this view of formalism. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 
564, 572 (1972) (describing Court’s movement away from “rigid or formalistic 
limitations”). 
 169 Posner, supra note 6, at 1664 (defining formalist interpretation as “at-
tempts to derive legal outcomes by methods superficially akin to deduction”). 
 170 E.g., Strauss, Foolish Inconsistency, supra note 20, at 497 (“The Chief 
Justice’s opinion . . . was formulaic and skeletal, emphasizing a formalistic 
analysis . . . .”); Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: 
Exactions and the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 609, 616–17 
(2004) (discussing “the Court’s constitutional rule formalism and the resulting 
formulaic administrative approach”); George Kannar, The Constitutional Cate-
chism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297, 1339 (1990) (“What he could do 
was use his positivist formalism to transform the inevitable value judgment 
these cases required into a more formulaic judgment by strictly applying stand-
ard rules concerning the burdens of proof.”); Stephen J. Toope, Preface, 41 
MCGILL L.J. 739, 740 (1996) (“In meeting that challenge, it is not enough to 
rehearse the formulaic and formalistic response that binding norms follow from 
the consent of states.”). 
 171 Pound, supra note 1, at 607 (“Undoubtedly one cause of the tendency of 
scientific law to become mechanical is to be found in the average man’s admira-
tion for the ingenious in any direction, his love of technicality as a manifestation 
of cleverness, his feeling that law, as a developed institution, ought to have a 
certain ballast of mysterious technicality.”). 
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derived jurisprudence into the mechanical application of rules (and 
especially technicalities) over substance.172 These uses, too, seem 
to miss much of what is behind modern formalism, but even if they 
didn’t, it is important to note up front that formulaic approaches 
need not be rooted in any particular approach, formalistic, concep-
tualist, or otherwise. Learned Hand’s formula for determining 
whether an act was negligent in United States v. Carroll Towing 
Co. was formulaic, but no one would call it formalist.173 Converse-
ly, purportedly formalist approaches like originalism require con-
siderable discretion in their application—hardly the application of 
a formula.174 The “formulaic” label does little to reveal the mean-
ing of modern formalism. 
Like modern references to Lochner’s formalism,175 modern re-
alists have also continued to attack what they perceive to be Lang-
dellian “legal formalism,”176 but in doing so, they completely miss 
the mark. As an initial matter, the conceptualist enterprise was fo-
 
 172 E.g., Nussbaum, supra note 162, at 62 (discussing “why judges should 
not hold too narrow, or too formalistic, a conception of their role”); Judith Res-
nik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 58 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 671, 689 (1989) (“Delineations between branches of the federal 
government are . . . not sharp, as a rigid separation of powers doctrine is rejected 
in favor of a less formalistic and more fluid model.”). 
 173 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) 
(Hand, J.) (“[I]f the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; 
liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < 
PL.”). So, too, Judge Posner’s preliminary injunction formula in American Hos-
pital Supply Corp. v. Hospital Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1985). See 
supra note 111, at 593. 
 174 See infra the text accompanying note 213. 
 175 See supra the text accompanying notes 133–37. 
 176 E.g., Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 164, at 878–79 (describing 
realist view that formalism requires “judges [to] mechanically apply a disem-
bodied entity called ‘The Law’”); Eskridge & Peller, supra note 131, at 712 
(describing the “rigid, rule-like deductivism associated with formalism”); Pos-
ner, supra note 6, at 1664 (defining formalist interpretation as “attempts to de-
rive legal outcomes by methods superficially akin to deduction”); Strauss, Fool-
ish Inconsistency, supra note 20, at 501 (“This is not a bright-line inquiry; Jus-
tice White preferred the uncertainty of functional inquiry to the difficulties of 
‘formalistic and unbending rules.’”). 
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cused on common law adjudication,177 while most modern formal-
ist debates are primarily about interpretation of statutes and consti-
tutions,178 a very different form of legal analysis than that envi-
sioned by Langdell. 
More importantly, conceptualism is also entirely absent in any 
modern understanding of formalism. To borrow Grey’s descrip-
tion, the formalism of the Langdellian orthodoxy was procedur-
al.179 Formalism in this sense is not the “strict or excessive adher-
ence to prescribed forms” of the first definition of the Oxford Eng-
lish Dictionary;180 rather, it is the mathematical sense of the sixth 
definition for the same entry: a “particular mathematical theory or 
mode of description of a physical situation or effect.”181 As Profes-
sor Brian Leiter explains, the “science” expounded by Langdell is 
better understood as approximating “Wissenschaft,” which Leiter 
translates from German as “a method or discipline that when cor-
rectly followed secures the reliability of its results.”182 Modern 
formalist approaches, like textualism, can be open-ended searches 
for meaning drawing on a variety of sources (cases, dictionaries 
and treatises, or even newspapers, popular press, and private letters 
 
 177 Cf. Grey, supra note 104, at 6, 8–10 (describing formalist view of “Con-
ceptual Order”). 
 178 Thus, Cass Sunstein’s recent essay, Formalism in Constitutional Theory, 
begins, “In law, what does it mean to ‘interpret’ a text, including the Constitu-
tion?” Cass R. Sunstein, Formalism in Constitutional Theory, 32 CONST. 
COMMENT. 27, 27 (2017); see also Farber, Inevitability, supra note 133, at 535–
547 (1992) (discussing topic of “Practical Reason Versus Formalism in Statuto-
ry Interpretation”). 
 179 See supra the text accompanying notes 108–11. 
 180 Schauer, OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 428 (quoting OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 80, at 83). 
 181 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 80, at 83. The third definition 
also borrows from mathematics, although in the sense of symbology rather than 
proof: “The conception of pure mathematics as the manipulation according to 
certain formal rules of symbols that are intrinsically meaningless.” Id. The sec-
ond definition is specific to religion, and the fourth and fifth refer to different 
movements in Russian theater and literature. Id. 
 182 Brian Leiter, Legal Realisms, Old and New, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 949, 959 
(2013) [hereinafter Leiter, Old and New]; see also Tamanaha, Combination, 
supra note 81, at 12 (“What jurisprudents now think of as classical formalism, it 
turns out, sounds a lot like nineteenth century German legal science.”). 
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depending on the topic)183—a stark contrast to conceptualist for-
malism’s application of logical steps approximating a mathemati-
cal proof.184 Far from early twentieth century conceptualism, late 
twentieth century formalism recognizes the shared and therefore 
necessarily form-bound nature of law; eschewing the determinism 
of conceptual formalism, modern formalism is exactly the oppo-
site: it rejects the possibility that the law is coherent, conceptual, 
and complete because it must be discussed in some form.185 In-
deed, when understood as describing a process for determining 
law, the conceptual orthodoxy’s “formalism” has more in common 
with the realists (who saw themselves as superior practitioners of 
the Wissenschaft of law by including materials outside of cases186) 
than it does with modern “formalist” approaches like textualism 
and originalism.187 
 
 183 If one were to apply the rigors of mathematical formalism to textualism, 
it would fail. See Abbe R. Gluck, Justice Scalia’s Unfinished Business in Statu-
tory Interpretation: Where Textualism’s Formalism Gave Up, 92 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 2053, 2057 (2017) [hereinafter Gluck, Unfinished Business] (“I have 
argued the merits of a single controlling interpretive approach to statutory inter-
pretation; for statutory interpretation methodology to be given stare decisis ef-
fect; for a theory of the canons that understands their source and their legal sta-
tus as common law. But I now believe that, although there is space for progress 
on this front, formalism will never be fully effectuated in this field.”). Thus, 
Abbe Gluck concludes that textualism as practiced today should not be called 
formalist. See id. at 2053 (“[T]he textualism that Justice Scalia deserves so much 
credit for creating never really embraced formalism at all.”). 
 184 Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional 
Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9. U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 173–74 (2006) (“A formalism that emphasizes fidelity to 
legal texts—constitutions, statutes, and precedents—cannot fairly be character-
ized as conceptualist, much less as relying on some form of Platonism.”). 
 185 See infra the text accompanying notes 226–41; see also Easterbrook, 
Original Intent, supra note 70, at 65–66 (acknowledging that statutes have gaps 
and may simply fail to address a particular topic); Frank H. Easterbrook, Stat-
utes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 542 (1988) (considering problem of 
statutes that do not apply to conduct). 
 186 Leiter, Old and New, supra note 182, at 959. The conception of the real-
ists as reductivist social scientists has been dramatically over-stated. See gener-
ally Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1975, 
1975 (2015). 
 187 On realism’s failure to deliver on its promise, see Schlag, supra note 91, 
at 217–18. 
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Thus, the most important thing to recognize about debates over 
“formalism” in the late twentieth century is that they pertained to a 
“formalism” that is quite different from the “formalism” criticized 
by the likes of Pound, Llewellyn, and Holmes.188 These attacks are 
really just a hangover from the early twentieth century realist at-
tack—they are attacking a conceptualist vision that has had no 
more than a handful of academic (and as far as I can tell no judi-
cial) adherents for almost 100 years. Today’s “formalism” and 
(critics of) yesterday’s “formalism” are getting at very different 
senses of the word, which means that comparisons among Lang-
dellian conceptualist formalism, Lochnerism, and modern formalist 
methods like textualism or originalism should be advanced cau-
tiously.189 It would be pretty hard to confuse one of Justice Scalia’s 
“formalist” opinions with one of Justice Peckham’s. 
If modern “formalism” is not Langdellian conceptualist formal-
ism, then what is it? One point of consistency between the histori-
cal debates and modern ones is the largely negative treatment of 
the concept of formalism. By “negative” in this context I mean not 
that formalism is cast in a negative light (although it frequently is) 
but that formalism is frequently defined not as an abstract matter 
for its own purpose but rather in juxtaposition to some alterna-
tive.190 To a critic of textualism who describes it as “formalistic,” 
formalism might mean something very different than it does to 
someone using the term to describe an approach that simply ig-
nores consequences. Some use the term with some connection to 
the conceptualist formalism of yesteryear: to describe a logical 
method of reasoning, usually based on concepts rather than conse-
 
 188 But cf. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 71, at 33–34 (1994) (“The turn-of-
the-century formalists and their current heirs maintain that the Court has a single 
goal: declaring and enforcing the rule of law.”). 
 189 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, What Judge Bork Should Have Said, 23 CONN. L. 
REV. 205, 215–16 (1991) [hereinafter Sunstein, Judge Bork] (“I conclude that 
originalism is merely the latest version of formalism in the law. It represents the 
pretense that one can decide hard cases in law by reference to value judgments 
made by someone else.”). 
 190 See, e.g., Schlag, supra note 91, at 197 (“Of all the great disputes that 
have marked American law, formalism vs. realism might well be among the 
most pervasive and significant.”); Sunstein, Empirically, supra note 4, at 639 
(describing various approaches opposed to formalism as “antiformalist”). 
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quences.191 But such uses are relatively uncommon, at least in dis-
cussing modern approaches, for the reasons described above: the 
lack of adherents to a conceptualist understanding of law means 
that there would be little for modern critics of conceptualist for-
malism to attack. Other uses are more varied. 
“Formalist” and “formalistic” are frequently used with neither 
explanation nor specificity to describe an approach that lacks so-
phistication. Thus, “formalistic” is deployed as a (frequently re-
dundant) synonym for “simplistic”192 or lacking nuance193 or any 
number of intellectual errors.194 For others, it’s “a sham”195 or “a 
lie.”196 As Robert Summers describes it, “American academics and 
practitioners came almost instinctively to condemn nearly every-
 
 191 E.g., Posner, supra note 6, at 1663 (“Legal formalism is the idea that 
legal questions can be answered by inquiry into the relation between concepts 
and hence without need for more than a superficial examination of their relation 
to the world of fact.”). 
 192 E.g., Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and 
Civil Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1681 (2009) (“In determining wheth-
er the First Amendment applies to civil liability, the nature of the injury ap-
proach has the undeniable virtue of attempting to avoid simplistic formalist solu-
tions.”). 
 193 E.g., Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and 
Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400, 411 (2015) (“This is obviously a highly styl-
ized, even formalistic, vision of how actual lawmaking processes operate.”); 
Trina Jones, Anti-Discrimination Law in Peril, 75 MO. L. REV. 423, 425 (2010) 
(“In examining discrimination claims under the Equal Protection Clause, the 
Court has resorted to a type of analytical formalism, similar to what one sees in 
pretext cases, that thwarts a nuanced and contextual examination of discrimina-
tion claims and impedes greater understanding of the nature of discrimination.”). 
 194 E.g., Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 923 (“It is very common to 
see a law professor complaining that some generalist court has blundered in its 
latest interpretation of the specialized statute that the professor has made a ca-
reer of studying; usually the blunder occurs because the court has, in the critic’s 
view, interpreted ‘woodenly,’ ‘mechanically,’ or ‘formalistically,’ with insuffi-
cient attention to history, policy, and nuance.”). 
 195 Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, supra note 3, at 756. 
 196 E.g., JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, HOW LAWYERS LOSE 
THEIR WAY 82 (2005) (describing “legal formalism” as “in less polite language, 
a lie”); Singer, supra note 122, at 520 (using “disingenuous” and “formalist” 
interchangeably); Strauss, Bill of Rights, supra note 167, at 547 (same); Sun-
stein, Judge Bork, supra note 189, at 215–16 (describing formalism as a “pre-
tense” that allows judges to make value judgments “covertly”). 
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thing wrong with law and legal reasoning as ‘formalistic’ (a prac-
tice that continues today in many quarters).”197 Even the modern 
era’s most famous, self-acknowledged formalist, Antonin Scalia, 
could not resist the temptation to enlist “formalistic” as an at-
tack.198 There is not much to be said for or about such uses—many 
are either unthinking or are extensions of more specific criticisms, 
which I address above—except to point out the comfort with which 
“formalist” is thrown around as an insult. 
Not all uses of the term have been so unthinkingly negative, 
though. Late twentieth century formalism is frequently encoun-
tered as a component of statutory or constitutional interpretation, 
and many have equated it with textualist approaches to interpreta-
tion.199 According to Cass Sunstein, formalism “entails an interpre-
tive method that relies on the text of the relevant law and that ex-
cludes or minimizes extratextual sources of law,”200 and according 
to Dan Farber, “[f]ormalist writers stress that law contains a good 
many rules, and that in many contexts, the application of those 
rules requires little more than a grasp of English usage. They rec-
ommend a heavier reliance on plain meaning in statutory interpre-
 
 197 Summers, supra note 44, at 244. For his part, Summers fought back, la-
beling approaches to law that ignore form as “substantivistic,” id. at 251, a usage 
that does not seem to have caught on. 
 198 See Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 174 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This 
rule leaves no room for a formalistic distinction between facts bearing on the 
number of years of imprisonment that a defendant will serve for one count (sub-
ject to the rule of Apprendi) and facts bearing on how many years will be served 
in total (now not subject to Apprendi).” (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466 (2000))). In fairness to Justice Scalia, he did use the term correctly (as 
I would define it) by comparing the forms of two rules and suggesting the form 
of one (the Apprendi rule) should take precedence over the form of another (the 
elements of a specific crime). See id. at 173 (“We have taken pains to reject 
artificial limitations upon the facts subject to the jury-trial guarantee. We long 
ago made clear that the guarantee turns upon the penal consequences attached to 
the fact [relevant to determining punishment, the category of facts subject to 
jury determination under Apprendi], and not to its formal definition as an ele-
ment of the crime.”). 
 199 See Sunstein, Empirically, supra note 4, at 639. 
 200 Id. 
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tation.”201 Justice Scalia described himself as a formalist in large 
part based on his commitment to textualism.202 
What is it about textualism that makes it formalist?203 Most 
make the connection between textualism and formalism through 
their mutual connection to language.204 An approach to formalism 
in law that emphasizes the role of text resembles the literary for-
malist tradition, which treats text as autonomous and ignores the 
historical or social context in which the work was written.205 But 
other forms of formalism seem to have less of a connection to lan-
guage as an autonomous system, and so they strain the language-
dependent understanding of formalism evident in the treatments of 
textualism.206 
Another methodology commonly associated with formalism is 
originalism.207 According to Erwin Chemerinsky, for instance, 
 
 201 Farber, Inevitability, supra note 133, at 543; see also Gluck, States as 
Laboratories, supra note 12, at 1758 (offering a “modified textualism”—”a 
theory that retains the fundamental text-first formalism of traditional textualism 
and yet still appears multitextured enough to offer a middle way in the methodo-
logical wars”). 
 202 Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 11, at 25 (“Of all the criticisms 
leveled against textualism, the most mindless is that it is ‘formalistic.’”). 
 203 See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, Ambivalence About Formalism, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 5 (2007) (“I will argue that textualists have placed undue emphasis on 
formalist strategies.”). 
 204 See Farber, Inevitability, supra note 133, at 543; see also Farber, Ages, 
supra note 5, at 101–02 (comparing Scalia and Langdell). 
 205 See generally LOIS TYSON, CRITICAL THEORY TODAY: A USER-FRIENDLY 
GUIDE 141 (2d ed. 2006) (“Because of New Criticism’s belief that the literary 
text can be understood primarily by understanding its form (which is why you’ll 
sometimes hear it referred to as a type of formalism), a clear understanding of 
the definitions of specific formal elements is important.”); Farber, Inevitability, 
supra note 133, at 534 (“Formalist interpretation, ultimately, relies on a faith in 
the raw power of the word to communicate . . . .”); see also Allan Beever, For-
malism in Music and Law, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 213, 216–17 (2011) (describing 
the use of formalism in music, which focuses on music’s form rather than its 
meaning and its connection to (conceptualist) formalism in the law). 
 206 Cf. Farber, Ages, supra note 5, at 91 (“[T]he temptation for formalists is 
to err in the opposite direction, abandoning formalist methods when such meth-
ods fail to satisfy their craving for stability, logic or order.”). 
 207 See, e.g., Farber, Ages, supra note 5, at 91; Dorf, supra note 14, at 11 
(noting that when originalism is challenged, it “is typically defended in formalist 
terms”); Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A 
 
154 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:113 
 
“[f]ormalism is inherent to the originalism of conservative Justices 
like Scalia and Thomas.”208 As with textualism, not all reference is 
negative. Michael Rappaport claims to apply an “originalist-
formalist conception of law.”209 Others, like Lawrence Solum, in-
clude both textualism and originalism as elements of what he calls 
a “neoformalist” approach to constitutional interpretation.210 
But the claim that originalism is formalist seems strained, at 
least if formalism is going to have any independent meaning. As 
Mark Tushnet points out, “[i]t seems worth noting that there is no 
necessary connection between formalism and originalism.”211 Of 
course, the two are not synonymous, and the better reading of such 
claims (including Chemerinsky’s) is not that originalism and for-
malism are identical but rather that originalism is either one type of 
formalism or that originalism depends in some way on formal-
ism.212 But even such claims seem to overstate the case. It’s not 
clear what is formalistic about originalism; originalism’s historical 
interpretation of understood meaning shares neither the clarity of 
textualism nor the same deductive objectivity of formal logical 
reasoning.213 “Nonetheless,” as Tushnet points out, “the connection 
 
Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 598 (1989) (discussing 
“formalist interpretations of the Constitution, including originalism”). 
 208 Chemerinsky, Foundation, supra note 10, at 205. 
 209 Rappaport, supra note 15, at 114. 
 210 See Solum, supra note 15, at 2494. 
 211 Mark Tushnet, The Sentencing Commission and Constitutional Theory: 
Bowls and Plateaus in Separation of Powers Theory, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 581, 
584 n.11 (1992). 
 212 Cf. Ethan J. Leib, Why Supermajoritarianism Does Not Illuminate the 
Interpretive Debate Between Originalists and Non-Originalists, 101 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1905, 1907 (2007) (“This latter form of pragmatism is simply not amena-
ble to the formalism that originalism requires . . . .”). 
 213 Nor does originalism necessarily push toward non-textual clarity. See 
Stephanos Bibas, Two Cheers, Not Three, for Sixth Amendment Originalism, 34 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 45–46 (2011) (“Justice Scalia likes originalism; he 
also likes formalism. In some cases, however, a judge must choose between the 
two. Sometimes originalism contradicts doctrines such as the exclusionary rule 
even though, intuitively, modern formalists should embrace the exclusionary 
rule because it is clear, simple, and instructs police exactly what not to do.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
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between formalism and originalism seems to be asserted regular-
ly.”214 
It is possible that the connection to textualism is doing much of 
the work of associating originalism with formalism.215 Many his-
torical sources are expressed in textual terms, allowing textual 
meaning to provide originalist understanding,216 and originalism 
can be used to identify (and freeze) the meaning of text, thus freez-
ing the law.217 But the comparison to textualism is also instructive 
on the other side of the argument: If textualism is formalist by vir-
tue of the objectivity and logic of textual analysis, originalism is 
far less formalist than textualism218 and maybe even less so than 
 
 214 Tushnet, supra note 211, at 584, n.11. 
 215 See Farber, Ages, supra note 5, at 91; Lawson, supra note 14, at 859 
(“[F]ormalism is inextricably tied to both textualism and originalism . . . .”); 
Molot, supra note 203, at 7 (“[T]hose who favor textualism in statutory interpre-
tation often favor originalism in constitutional interpretation.”); Krotoszynski, 
supra note 20, at 1545 (“In circumstances where the Constitution provides con-
flicting textual mandates, formalism—particularly its strictest, originalist-
textualist variety—does not work.”). 
 216 Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 11, at 16–18 (distinguishing 
atextual intentionalism from textualist originalism); Raban, supra note 131, at 
345; Shane, supra note 207, at 602 (“Originalism is the species of formalism—
that is, history partly expressed in text . . . .”). 
 217 HART, supra note 2, at 129 (“One way of [disguising and minimizing the 
need for judges to make choices in applying rules to specific cases] is to freeze 
the meaning of the rule so that its general terms must have the same meaning in 
every cases where its application is in question.”); Stephanos Bibas, Originalism 
and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Un-
likely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 188 (2005). 
 218 Scalia, Originalism, supra note 76, at 856 (“[I]t is often exceedingly dif-
ficult to plumb the original understanding of an ancient text.”). By conceptualist 
standards, originalism is not formalist at all because it denies that law is a con-
ceptually complete enterprise, since it requires the consideration of so many 
extra-legal materials. Id. at 857 (describing the difficulty of applying originalism 
and explaining that “[i]t is, in short, a task sometimes better suited to the histori-
an than the lawyer”); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 269, 295 (2017) (“[A] rigorous account of originalist methodolo-
gy . . . requires an interdisciplinary approach that critically evaluates and adapts 
techniques from linguistics and history but retains and modifies the sophisticated 
interpretive techniques that have been developed by lawyers.”). 
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explicitly consequentialist theories like those underlying Hand’s 
Carroll Towing formula.219 
The focus of modern arguments in favor of formalism (as op-
posed to criticizing it) has been on textualism and originalism, but 
formalism goes beyond textualism and originalism. Any method of 
legal reasoning that focuses on the law’s form is formalist. For ex-
ample, Chief Justice Marshall’s argument in M‘Culloch v. Mary-
land that the Necessary and Proper Clause is better seen as an en-
hancement rather than a restriction on Congress’s powers because 
it is found among the power-conferring clauses of Article I, Sec-
tion 8 rather than among the limits in Section 9 was formalist be-
cause it focused on the clause’s location, an attribute of form.220 
4. UNITY IN DISAGREEMENT: A RESPONSE TO THE ANTI-
FORMALISTS 
Even if it is clear that modern formalist methodologies have lit-
tle to do with early twentieth century Langdellian conceptualist 
formalism, the arguments against them do overlap. The most obvi-
ous characteristic attacked by critics of both strains of formalism is 
their purported determinism.221 As discussed above, criticisms of 
the purported determinism of formalism are hardly new; they were 
an essential (perhaps the singularly most important) element of the 
realist critique of conceptualist formalism,222 and criticism of de-
terminism unites critics of (what I consider misplaced) Lochnerian 
formalism with critics of modern “formalist”223 techniques such as 
textualism224 and originalism.225 
 
 219 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 
1947). 
 220 M‘Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 419 (1819) (“The clause 
is placed among the powers of Congress, not among the limitations on those 
powers.”). 
 221 See, e.g., Leiter, Positivism, supra note 99, at 1152–53. 
 222 See Singer, supra note 122, at 499–502. Certainly it was the determinism 
of combined conceptualism and formalism that motivated Holmes, whose rejec-
tion of formalism spanned both public and private law. See William Michael 
Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of Mahon, 86 
GEO. L.J. 813, 854–55 (1998). 
 223 E.g., Dorf, supra note 14, at 11–12 (“Textualism, originalism, and other 
brands of formalism do not trade flexibility for predictability, but for the false 
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As was the case with the similar claim made by the realists, the 
claim against the determinism of modern formalism is overstated. 
While it may be difficult to find modern scholars claiming to be 
formalists, it is practically impossible to find ones making a claim 
that any of the “formalist” methodologies are perfectly determinis-
tic. Justice Scalia, the figure most widely associated with modern 
formalism,226 never advanced such a view. Although Scalia did 
claim among the advantages of both textualism and originalism 
that they were deterministic, his claim was entirely comparative (as 
suggested by the title of one of his earlier papers on originalism: 
“The Lesser Evil”227), not absolute.228 In addition to the historical 
interpretive problems presented by originalism,229 Justice Scalia 
was more than willing to acknowledge that text could be indeter-
minate, which he believed could be either accidental or intention-
al.230 Modern critics of formalism tend to overstate the claim of 
 
promise of predictability.”); Farber, Inevitability, supra note 133, at 534 
(“[F]ormalism cannot deliver on its promise to provide greater implementation 
of these important ‘rule of law’ virtues.”). 
 224 E.g., Farber, Inevitability, supra note 133, at 547–48 (“Even eliminating 
the canons in favor of pure textualism would not leave statutory interpretation a 
mechanical task.”); Gluck, Unfinished Business, supra note 183, at 2060 (“By 
applying consistent interpretive rules, formalism seeks to realize ‘rule of law 
values’ such as transparency, predictability, and objectivity in the law. We have 
not gotten there in statutory interpretation and we likely never will.”). 
 225 E.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor’s Clothes: Recognizing the 
Reality of Constitutional Decision Making, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1072–73 
(2006) [hereinafter Chermerinksy, Emperor’s Clothes]. 
 226 Fallon, supra note 10, at 15. 
 227 Scalia, Originalism, supra note 76, at 855 (“It is not enough to demon-
strate that the other fellow’s candidate (originalism) is no good; one must also 
agree upon another candidate to replace him.”). 
 228 See infra note 234. But see Leiter, Positivism, supra note 99, at 1150 
(“Hart thinks it the duty of judges to exercise discretion . . . . Formalists like 
Dworkin and Scalia are, of course, committed to denying all of 
these . . . claims.”). 
 229 See supra text accompanying note 218. 
 230 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of 
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516 (1989) (“An ambiguity in a statute committed to 
agency implementation can be attributed to either of two congressional desires: 
(1) Congress intended a particular result, but was not clear about it; or (2) Con-
gress had no particular intent on the subject, but meant to leave its resolution to 
the agency.”); see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 
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modern formalists that methodologies like textualism and original-
ism conclusively determine outcomes through a process of deduc-
tion.231 
Although such a deductive claim might have been part of the 
Langdellian conceptualist formalism, it is decidedly lacking in 
modern formalist claims, which are focused more on constraining 
discretion than on providing deterministic outcomes.232 The dis-
tinction between deductive determinacy and constraint is a key for 
understanding modern formalist theories like Scalia’s. If constraint 
can exist even in the absence of complete determinism—such as by 
limiting the sources available for argument without claiming that 
those sources necessarily resolve all arguments233—then modern 
formalism’s lack of deductive determinacy is not a failure at all. 
My point is not to refute the determinacy argument234 but rather to 
highlight it as unifying a multitude of criticisms of “formalist” 
methodologies. As with the realist attack on the Langdellian ortho-
doxy, though, formalism’s unsustainable claim of determinacy is 
 
732 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (“The Sherman Act adopted the term ‘restraint of trade’ 
along with its dynamic potential. It invokes the common law itself, and not 
merely the static content that the common law had assigned to the term in 
1890.”); Alan J. Meese, Justice Scalia and Sherman Act Textualism, 92 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 2013, 2015–16, 2023–24 (2017) (discussing Justice Scalia’s in-
terpretation of the Sherman Act). 
 231 E.g., Chemerinsky, Emperor’s Clothes, supra note 225, at 1073 (claiming 
that originalists and formalists “argue that their theory allows judges to deduce 
answers without discretion”). 
 232 See, e.g., Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 71, at 1179–1180. 
 233 Lawrence B. Solum, Pluralism and Public Legal Reason, 15 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 7, 15–16 (2006) (describing the various steps, including 
default rules of indeterminate texts, of a neoformalist approach to interpreta-
tion). 
 234 In the end, the determinacy argument is more properly addressed and 
responded to by modern positivism than by modern formalism. Hart himself 
acknowledged that any source of law will in the hardest of hard cases ultimately 
require an act of discretion on the part of a judge. See HART, supra note 2, at 
129. I don’t think such an eventual jump to discretion depends on what interpre-
tive methodology the judge employs, but more importantly, it doesn’t seem to 
me that Hart needs my help in addressing what to do when the law “runs out.” 
Cf. Schlag, supra note 91, at 203 n.28 (on the difficulties faced by formalists 
when the law fails to comply with the “legal formalist ideal”). 
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one of its critics’ own construction, perhaps because it makes such 
an attractive target.235 
Not only is the “formalism” of today different than the “for-
malism” of yesterday, the nature of the determinism being attacked 
by modern anti-formalists is entirely different than that attacked by 
the realists. The determinism attacked by the realists was a deter-
minism founded in conceptualism—a determinism based in the 
conceptual completeness of the law.236 Modern formalism involves 
no similar conceptualist claim, even in the eyes of its critics. I sug-
gested that modern textualists and originalists have been unfairly 
painted as suggesting their methods were determinist,237 but no one 
has even suggested (unfairly or otherwise) that the purported de-
terminism of modern “formalist” techniques like textualism and 
originalism is a product of conceptual completeness—that the 
Framers foresaw every eventuality or that text captures every po-
tential application of a statute. 
Instead, the modern anti-formalist criticisms are of the ability 
of particular forms (largely text) to convey the meaning of the 
law.238 Any particular text is open to several readings, and even 
practitioners of originalism confess the difficulty of determining 
original meaning.239 Again, these concerns may or may not be val-
id, but they are completely different than a claim that there is a set 
of completely determinative principles underlying the law. The 
latter is a point about the substance of the law; the former is one 
about the ability of different forms to supply the meaning of the 
law. One is about whether law is conceptual; the other is about the 
limits of form. 
Thus, it is commitment to form that unites both the proponents 
and (far more numerous) opponents of the various methodologies 
criticized under the rubric of modern formalism. One thing that 
textualism and originalism have in common is that they privilege 
 
 235 Leiter, Positivism, supra note 99, at 1146 (describing the “‘vulgar formal-
ist’ of popular imagination” who “accepts the rational determinacy of the law” 
and “the mechanical nature of judging”). 
 236 See supra text accompanying notes 120–26. 
 237 See supra text accompanying notes 221–32. 
 238 See Farber, supra note 133, at 534 (“Formalist methods of statutory inter-
pretation . . . [fail to] ease communication between legislatures and citizens.”). 
 239 See supra the text accompanying note 218. 
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form over substance, and most of their critics advance methodolo-
gies that emphasize the importance of substance.240 The argument 
they levy against formalism is that its comparative advantage of 
increased determinism is not enough to outweigh the suboptimal 
outcomes it leads to in individual cases.241 The same was true of 
early critics, such as Holmes, whose objection to formalism was 
similarly pragmatic.242 Defining formalism as commitment to form 
identifies its essence—from the standpoint of not only its support-
ers but also its critics. 
5. LEAVING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY BATTLEFIELDS OF 
FORMALISM BEHIND 
Even as it has been the subject of debate over the last century, 
formalism retains its essential feature as a commitment to inter-
preting law through its form instead of deriving its meaning in 
some other way. Although “formalism” is a term that has become 
caught up in battles over methodologies that have little to do with 
formalism (such as the Langdellian conceptualism) and has been 
attacked for its association with methodologies (like originalism) 
for reasons having little to do with their formalism, it is still possi-
ble to identify formalism as distinct from those methodologies and 
as a distinct approach to law.243 It is understandable that formalism 
would become a target in those battles, but it is time to step away 
from those battles to consider formalism in its own right. 
 
 240 E.g., Chemerinsky, Foundation, supra note 10, at 206; Dorf, supra note 
14, at 9–10 ; Farber, Inevitability, supra note 133, at 550; Posner, supra note 6, 
at 1663–64; Sunstein, Empirically, supra note 4, at 650–52. 
 241 Farber, Inevitability, supra note 133, at 534 (“[F]ormalism cannot deliver 
on its promise to provide greater implementation of . . . important ‘rule of law’ 
virtues.”); see also Sunstein, Empirically, supra note 4, at 641 (“More specifi-
cally, I claim that formalism, as an approach to statutory interpretation, must be 
defended by empirical claims about the likely performance and activities of 
courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, and private parties.”). 
 242 Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 
819–20 (1989). 
 243 See supra Part II.B.4. 
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II. BRINGING FORMALISM INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Although formalism has served as a proxy for other approaches 
to law, from methodologies like conceptualist determinism or tex-
tualism or more general approaches,244 formalism is not the same 
as the methodologies with which it has been associated. By con-
sidering formalism separately, not only does the concept of “for-
malism” become more useful as a way to articulate the degree to 
which a particular methodology is comparatively concerned with 
form, it allows for both consideration of legal form in determining 
the substance of the law and the possibility that legal form might 
have its own independent meaning apart from the substance of the 
law. By looking at how formalism is used outside of its twentieth 
century battlegrounds, we can get a better idea of how formalism 
contributes to legal thinking. Formalism has been used productive-
ly in two areas of law: understanding the role of process in law and 
debates over separation of powers. 
A. Formalism as an Independent Component of Legal 
Understanding 
Saying that formalism is a commitment to considering law 
based on its form is either saying a lot or nothing at all. No one 
takes either extreme view that form is irrelevant or that it is the 
only consideration. At least as a matter of informing legal analysis 
that drives outcomes, the claim that form matters may at first seem 
to be a pretty weak one.245 
But even the limited claim that formalism is an acknowledge-
ment that form matters goes a long way toward both classifying 
and understanding arguments as comparatively formalist or non-
formalist. Textualism and originalism have gotten most of the at-
tention, but as I suggested above, there are any number of ways 
that an approach can be formalist, and so it can be helpful simply 
to acknowledge the degree to which a particular approach is either 
formalist or not. Chief Justice Marshall’s reliance on the location 
 
 244 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Emperor’s Clothes, supra note 225, at 1071–73. 
 245 Cf. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, supra note 101, at 610 (describing an 
approach to formalism as “emphasis on forms” as “something of a pun: forms 
matter”). 
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of the Necessary and Proper Clause was formalist; by contrast, his 
argument in the same case that Congress’s Article I powers should 
not be read restrictively because the Framers understood that the 
Constitution would have to be applied to many unforeseen circum-
stances was comparatively less formalist.246 Simply having a con-
cept to distinguish approaches that depend on form from those that 
depend on something else is valuable. Thus, understanding “for-
malism” as relying on form as a component of legal understanding 
(and argumentation) has its own value by allowing descriptive 
claims about the use of form quite apart from normative claims 
about whether or when to do so. 
One might be a formalist for widely varying reasons based in 
widely varying commitments. Justice Scalia justified his formalism 
on institutional grounds, as necessary to a system that allocates 
power to authors rather than appliers of positive law,247 but he 
could also have justified it on a claim that the Framers were simply 
smarter than we are and that their utterances were therefore deserv-
ing of our deference. Those would be very different normative jus-
tifications for originalism even though the formalism of the ap-
proach might remain the same. Similarly, one could argue the rela-
tive difficulty of deciphering text that was written ten years ago 
and that which was written 230 years ago means that textualism is 
less valuable in the latter than the former case while still acknowl-
edging that textualism would be equally formalist in either case. 
Many methodologies represent a commitment to form, and some of 
them for similar reasons, but formalism and formalist methodolo-
gies are not all justified by a single set of considerations.248 Recog-
nizing formalism as a distinct element of a number of methodolo-
gies allows one to separately consider both of those methodologies 
themselves and the formalism that they rely upon. 
Distinguishing formalism from the methodologies it has been 
associated with opens the door to considering formalism’s broader 
role in many theories of law. Formalism is present not only in tex-
 
 246 See M‘Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407–10 (1819). 
 247 Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 71, at 1182–85. 
 248 Sunstein, Empirically, supra note 4, at 638 (“It is not easy to define the 
term ‘formalism,’ partly because there is no canonical kind of formalism.” (in-
ternal citation omitted)). 
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tual approaches like textualism and originalism but also in ap-
proaches that focus on source (as in positivism), process, and struc-
ture.249 Although Hart himself criticized conceptualist “formal-
ism,”250 his positivism was perfectly formalist in that it suggested 
the centrality of form—in his case the point of origin—of law.251 
Hart’s rule of recognition is itself formalist, since it defines what is 
law by virtue of its discernible features, not its substance.252 It is 
little wonder, then, that Schauer started with formalism in develop-
ing what he would eventually come to call “presumptive positiv-
ism;”253 it is formalism that unites Schauer’s account of rule-based 
decision-making (which, as I suggested above, need not be formal-
ist) with Hart’s positivism. Formalism extends not only to text or 
location (as in Marshall’s analysis of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause in M‘Culloch254), but also to source.255 The predilection 
that we have in most cases to identify law by its source (we treat 
judicial opinions differently than statutes and statutes differently 
than political stump speeches) is itself formalist. In this sense, 
originalism’s emphasis on the text as understood by a specific 
group (those alive at the time)256 makes it doubly formalist because 
it emphasizes a form of form—text as both the basis for under-
standing and the source of the accepted understanding of that text. 
Thus my argument that we are all formalists, since form plays a 
part in virtually any practical understanding of law. Hart’s formal-
ist rule of recognition works for most purposes—most debate is on 
its ability to handle the hard cases, an implied concession that it 
largely handles the easy ones.257 That is not to say we are all for-
 
 249 See, e.g., Sebok, supra note 103, at 2061 (“Legal positivism overlaps 
with both legal realism and legal formalism, although it is identical to neither.”). 
 250 See supra the text accompanying note 120. 
 251 See HART, supra note 2, at 94–95. 
 252 Id.  
 253 SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 196. 
 254 See M‘Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407–10 (1819). 
 255 See Meese, supra note 230, at 2027–28 (Describing “super statutes” and 
how judges impute the source of a text when deciding how to apply interpreta-
tive methods). 
 256 See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power 
to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 552–53 (1994) (describing process of 
determining original meaning). 
 257 HART, supra note 2, at 94–95. 
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malists to the same degree or that formalism informs all interpre-
tive methodologies equally. But simply being able to identify for-
malism as a component of different methodologies and to evaluate 
the merits of that formalism in its own right—as a distinct compo-
nent of those methodologies with its own justification—is a step 
toward engaging formalism on its own terms. 
But modern formalism goes beyond an abstract understanding 
that form matters to law; it is a claim about why form matters to 
law. Modern formalist methodologies like textualism and original-
ism are grounded in an understanding that our conversations about 
law are necessarily limited to characteristics of law we can per-
ceive in a shared way.258 Modern formalism recognizes that, much 
more than assigning winners and losers in disputes, law communi-
cates.259 Separating formalism from the outcome-driven debates 
that have dominated discussion of its merits—like debates over 
textualism and originalism and their alternatives—allows a whole 
new set of claims about formalism and its value. Part of law’s val-
ue is in its ability to communicate, and it is through formalism that 
that value can be recognized and realized. 
In the end, the question is not whether form matters—form 
clearly matters. The real question is how viewing the law through 
the lens of form helps us better understand the law and how it op-
erates. I will focus briefly on how formalism operates in two very 
different aspects of law before considering some consequences of 
formalism for how we think about law. 
B. Formalism and Process 
All process appears as form, but considering formalism as a 
separate aspect of process allows us to distinguish its role in pro-
cess. In U.S. constitutional law, the process of bicameralism and 
presentment is arguably the most central process there is, since it 
 
 258 See HART, supra note 2, at 125; Easterbrook, Statutory Interpretation, 
supra note 15, at 64 (describing legal interpretation as “a social enterprise”). 
 259 See, e.g., id. at 124–25; Farber, Inevitability, supra note 133, at 549 
(“[T]he best argument for formalism is that it makes the meaning of legal texts 
more transparent, and therefore more accessible to ordinary citizens, legislators, 
and others . . . .”). 
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defines what is and is not federal statute law.260 A formalist ap-
proach to bicameralism and presentment allows one to distinguish 
the process itself from its justifications, thereby providing intellec-
tual space to consider both separately. That ability is particularly 
helpful with a process like bicameralism and presentment, a pro-
cess that has remained unchanged even while many of its underly-
ing justifications have changed.261 The adoption of the Seventeenth 
Amendment altered the constituency of the Senate (from the legis-
latures of the States to the people of the States), thereby shifting 
the role of the Senate and with it the justification underlying the 
process for making federal statute law without changing the form 
of the process at all. 262 A formalist approach would ignore this 
underlying change in the Senate’s constituency, but more im-
portantly, a formalist approach allows one to distinguish this 
change in the Senate’s constituency from other changes and their 
effects on the Senate’s role in making federal statute law, such as 
the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendment’s expansions of the fran-
chise263 or the Civil War’s alteration of the political and economic 
forces that may have justified the original organization of the Sen-
ate.264 
A formalist approach to process treats process as distinct from 
its underlying purpose. In Neder v. United States, the Supreme 
Court confronted the question of whether taking an element of a 
criminal offense away from the jury could ever be harmless er-
 
 260 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 261 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct 
Election: A Structural Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. 
REV. 1347, 1353–55 (1996). 
 262 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; see Amar, supra note 261, at 1353–55; David 
N. Schleicher & Todd J. Zywicki, The Seventeenth Amendment, INTERACTIVE 
CONST., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/
amendment-xvii/interps/147 (last visited Nov. 18, 2020). 
 263 U.S. CONST. amend XV (prohibiting denial of right to vote “on account 
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX 
(prohibiting denial of the right to vote “on account of sex”). 
 264 See generally Schleicher & Zywicki, supra note 262 (explaining how the 
Seventeenth Amendment was passed in the wake of the Civil War and “removed 
from state legislatures the power to choose U.S. Senators and gave that power 
directly to voters in each state”). 
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ror.265 The majority concluded it could, especially when the appel-
late court found that the element at issue (whether Neder’s failure 
to report “over $5 million in income” was a material falsehood for 
the purposes of the tax fraud statute266) “was uncontested and sup-
ported by overwhelming evidence such that the jury verdict would 
have been the same absent the error.”267 In so doing, the Court ap-
plied the standard for evaluating such errors it had established in 
Johnson v. United States,268 whether the error “seriously affects the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”269 
To the majority, the question was one of fairness, perhaps the most 
substantive question of all.270 
Justice Scalia, whose formalism reached far beyond textualism 
and originalism, dissented in a characteristically formalist way.271 
For him, the question was simply whether the conviction had com-
plied with the Sixth Amendment requirement of trial by jury, ex-
plicitly rejecting the majority’s fairness analysis.272 The trial, ac-
cording to Scalia, did not follow the required form for a federal 
criminal trial and the certainty of the outcome (a matter of sub-
stance) was no answer to the defect in form.273 
That is not to say that the form exists absent a justification 
(Scalia offered one: mistrust of judges274), but whether we could 
all agree that Neder was actually guilty (which was the majority’s 
understanding of the justification for the form275) or whether the 
 
 265 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999). In the interest of full disclo-
sure, I was one of Neder’s attorneys at the Supreme Court, although I did not 
work on the harmless-error portion of the case. 
 266 Id. at 16. 
 267 Id. at 17. 
 268 Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997). 
 269 Neder, 527 U.S. at 9 (quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469). 
 270 See id. at 9. 
 271 See id. at 30–40 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 272 Id. at 31–32; U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial ju-
ry . . . .”). 
 273 Neder, 527 U.S. at 34 (“The very premise of structural-error review is 
that even convictions reflecting the ‘right’ result are reversed for the sake of 
protecting a basic right.”). 
 274 Id. at 32. 
 275 Id. at 18–20 (majority opinion). 
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judge in question was actually untrustworthy (which was Scalia’s 
understanding of the justification for the form276) was beside the 
point. And here we see the connection to Schauer’s rule-based de-
cision-making.277 Although there might be a justification underly-
ing the form, for Scalia, that justification was irrelevant to the 
question of whether to insist that the form be observed in the par-
ticular case.278 For the majority, the justification was always rele-
vant.279 Justice Stevens, who dissented separately, was also willing 
to consider justification over form, suggesting that the Court’s in-
sistence on juries might vary depending on the type of case, since 
some cases present greater threats to the justification he credited 
than others.280 
Scalia’s formalism, unlike the majority’s pragmatism, allows 
juries to have value independent of their justifications. The inde-
pendent value of forms like juries is important in a variety of ways. 
As Schauer explains, it allows judges to be wrong about the (com-
paratively difficult to determine) justifications for particular forms 
while still having the power to adjudicate disputes over the forms 
themselves.281 But it also allows for the possibility that juries are 
an instantiation of an under-theorized set of justifications, some of 
which are unrelated or might even be in tension with each other. 
 
 276 See id. at 39. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 277 SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 231–32. 
 278 See Neder, 527 U.S. at 39–40; see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466, 498–99 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discounting “bureaucratic realm of 
perfect equity” suggested by Justice Breyer’s dissent but not arguing that that 
the jury might have come to a different conclusion than a judge would have). 
Not that Justice Scalia was allergic to purpose. He advanced one in Neder itself 
(even if he didn’t think the purpose was served in the case) and in other cases on 
the jury right. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 39–40 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also 
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 308 (2004) (Scalia, J.) (“[T]he very rea-
son the Framers put a jury-trial guarantee in the Constitution is that they were 
unwilling to trust government to mark out the role of the jury.”). 
 279 See Neder, 527 U.S. at 17–18 (majority opinion). 
 280 Id. at 28 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(“[T]his Court has not been properly sensitive to the importance of protecting 
the right to have a jury resolve critical issues of fact when there is a special dan-
ger that elected judges may listen to the voices of voters rather than witnesses. A 
First Amendment case and a capital case will illustrate my point.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 281 SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 131–34. 
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Are juries really better at finding facts than judges (which figured 
prominently in the majority’s justification282 but was lacking in 
Scalia’s political one283), and are they less susceptible to political 
pressures than judges (which figured in both Scalia’s and Stevens’s 
justifications, albeit in opposing fashions284)? Who knows? The 
answer might even depend on who is asking.285 
The purpose of juries is many-faceted and it may be that no 
single theory justifies juries.286 Perhaps because it cannot identify a 
particular justification for juries, the Court has consistently re-
mained committed to the jury form as a form independent of the 
effect on outcomes in jury-rights cases, from Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia287 in 1880 through the twenty-first century Apprendi-Blakely-
Booker line of cases regarding the role of juries in the modern 
criminal sentencing system.288 In all of those cases, the Court has 
relied on the Constitution’s insistence of the jury form without re-
quiring the defendant to articulate that the justification for the form 
was implicated in his particular case.289 
Far from formalism in the sense of rigidity, acknowledging the 
independent value of form allows for the justifications for and 
meaning of forms to vary over time, circumstance, and perspective. 
In Strauder, for instance, the Court identified two separate harms 
 
 282 See Neder, 527 U.S. at 17–20 (majority opinion). 
 283 Id. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 284 See id. at 28 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment); id at 34. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 285 It is also possible that we might want juries because of their ability to 
consider factors outside the facts or law in rendering their verdicts, see Peter 
Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 
SUP. CT. REV. 81, 129–32, a justification whose contours would be particularly 
difficult to articulate since the sensibilities required might be very different in 
very different circumstances. Of course, that raises the question of why acquit-
tals by judges receive similar finality. See id. at 132–35. 
 286 See Robert C. Walters et al., Jury of Our Peers: An Unfulfilled Constitu-
tional Promise, 58 SMU L. REV. 319, 321–23 (2005) (discussing numerous 
historical opinions on role and importance of juries). 
 287 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
 288 See generally Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); United States. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005). 
 289 See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 500; Blakely, 542 
U.S. at 308; Booker, 543 U.S. at 230. 
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(the inability to have members of the same race on one’s jury and 
limitations on the right to serve on a jury) suffered by two separate 
individuals (the defendant and the prospective juror respectively), 
but required that neither harm be realized (there being no affirma-
tive right for members of any particular race to serve on any par-
ticular jury) for there to be a violation.290 Strauder’s insistence on 
the jury form opened up the possibility of a shift in the meaning of 
jury service—one that emphasizes the role in governance that jury 
service signifies and the implications of including different groups 
in that form of governance.291 
C. Formalism and Separation of Powers 
As the previous mention of bicameralism and presentment sug-
gests, formalism can play (and has played) a prominent role in the 
field of constitutional separation of powers.292 Why “formalism” 
should play an important role in separation of powers is something 
of a mystery. If “formalism” is a textual interpretive approach,293 it 
 
 290 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306–09; see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 
85–88 (1986). 
 291 See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 48–49 (1992) (holding that ra-
cially motivated strikes by defense lawyers are constitutional violations in part 
because of political significance of jury service to jurors). 
 292 See Kent Barnett, Standing for (and up to) Separation of Powers, 91 IND. 
L.J. 665, 676 (2016) (describing “formalism’s ascendancy” in separation of 
powers doctrine); Krotoszynski, supra note 20, at 1517–18; Lawson, supra note 
14, at 859; Magill, supra note 21, at 1183; Strauss, Foolish Inconsistency, supra 
note 20, at 489–90; Resnik, supra note 172, at 675–76; Huq & Michaels, supra 
note 14, at 425; Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Gov-
ern”: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 
DUKE L.J. 449, 449–50 (1991). As with many treatments of formalism and func-
tionalism, though, it is easy to over-state the divide. See William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of Pow-
ers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 21 (1998); Huq & Michaels, supra 
note 14, at 435. 
 293 Krotoszynski, supra note 20, at 1527–28 (“Formalism relies on a kind of 
textualist analysis and places great structural weight on the Vesting Clauses of 
Articles I, II, and III.”); Linda D. Jellum, ‘‘Which Is to Be Master,” the Judici-
ary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 
56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 861 (2009) (“Formalism is, thus, a textually literal ap-
proach that relies primarily on the vesting clauses to define categories of pow-
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is not clear why it would apply in a distinct way in the separation 
of powers context. Separation of powers cases do not present unu-
sual interpretive challenges294 (although there is a paucity of appli-
cable text and the Court’s determinations are difficult to reverse, 
the same is true of virtually any constitutional question). Liz 
Magill suggests that separation of powers cases present the 
rules/standards problem that Schauer treats under the rubric of 
formalism,295 but again, it’s not clear how separation of powers 
presents this problem in a distinct way, and I think formalism can 
be distinguished from rule-based decision-making in the separation 
of powers context as easily as it can in any other.296 Yet formalism 
is acknowledged to be one of the two dominant approaches to sep-
aration of powers297—a primacy of position it enjoys in virtually 
no other area of legal thought. 
The answer, I think, lies in the centrality of form to separation 
of powers debates.298 The question in such cases is how to attribute 
power to the institutional forms defined in the Constitution rather 
 
er—legislative, executive, and judicial—and to identify the owner of each pow-
er.”). Nor is the formalism of separation of powers particularly originalist. 
 294 Manning, supra note 20, at 1947–50. 
 295 Magill, supra note 21, at 1138; see also Huq & Michaels, supra note 14, 
at 355–56. 
 296 The rules versus form distinction is readily apparent in the “formalist” 
position of attributing actions to branches. See Lawson, supra note 14, at 858 
(“The separation of powers principle is violated whenever the categorizations of 
the exercised power and the exercising institution do not match and the Consti-
tution does not specifically permit such blending.”). That approach to applying 
the constraints of form is dependent on identifying the nature of a particular 
governmental action as either executive, legislative, or judicial, an inquiry that is 
about as rule-like as determining whether a particular act was “reasonable.” See 
Magill, supra note 21, at 1141–42; Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Ad-
ministrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1238 n.45 (“The problem of distin-
guishing the three functions of government has long been, and continues to be, 
one of the most intractable puzzles in constitutional law.”). 
 297 Magill, supra note 21, at 1136 (“Among commentators there are two 
well-defined and competing positions: formalism and functionalism.”). 
 298 See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. 
REV. 841, 853 (2014) (citation omitted) (“I focus here on formal or structural 
attributes of organizations, including agency design and assigned func-
tions . . . . I limit my attention to these less subjective and more formalist, struc-
tural elements in order to gain some descriptive and predictive traction.”). 
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than a substantive evaluation299 of an act in comparison to a consti-
tutional standard like “equal protection of the laws”300 or “freedom 
of speech.”301 That is, separation of powers controversies are no 
more amenable to resolution by rule than other areas of constitu-
tional discourse, but they are more closely tied to form than other 
areas of constitutional discourse. Formalism continues to matter in 
separation of powers debates because form matters in separation of 
powers debates. 
Moreover, unlike in many contexts, formalism itself is not ag-
nostic as to outcome in separation of powers cases. As Magill ex-
plains, applying formalism in separation of powers can “have dra-
matic practical consequences;”302 adherence to the forms of the 
Constitution could place in question the existence of most of the 
administrative state.303 Formalism’s claim that form matters is also 
a claim that form should matter. It is a commonplace in the separa-
tion of powers debate that the innovations of the administrative 
state are at the very least in tension with governmental form as de-
scribed in the Constitution, and so formalism is hardly neutral with 
regard to the existence of such innovations on constitutional 
form.304 (How much it should matter is a question beyond the 
scope of my inquiry.) 
But even with regard to institutions clearly falling within the 
constitutional forms—Congress, the executive, and the courts—
formalism plays a major part in the debate. Magill describes both 
formalism and its purported opposite, functionalism: 
 
 299 See Summers, supra note 44, at 256 (“The very subject-matter of rules 
establishing government structures is formal, in contrast to the content of the 
law created and administered by and through the system of government.”); 
Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 16, at 405 (“Under formalist ideology, the 
Court’s role in statutory interpretation is not to facilitate the dominant political 
coalition’s evolving preferences, but to protect the formal structures of our de-
mocracy.”). 
 300 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
 301 See id.  amend. I. 
 302 Magill, supra note 21, at 1140. 
 303 Id. at 1140–41; Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism after the New Deal, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 494 (1987). 
 304 See Magill, supra note 21, at 1140. 
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Among commentators there are two well-defined 
and competing positions: formalism and functional-
ism . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . [T]he structural provisions of the Constitu-
tion specify the type (legislative, executive, judicial) 
and place (Congress, President, Supreme Court) of 
all governmental power. The judge assessing the va-
lidity of an institutional arrangement must first 
identify the type of power being exercised and, un-
less one of the explicitly provided-for exceptions is 
relevant, make certain that that power is exercised 
by an official residing in the appropriate govern-
mental institution. 
. . . . 
Formalism’s competitor, functionalism, is like-
wise a set of postulates rather than a single precept. 
Where a formalist is committed to rule-based deci-
sionmaking, a functionalist . . . would resolve struc-
tural disputes “not in terms of fixed rules but rather 
in light of an evolving standard designed to advance 
the ultimate purposes of a system of separation of 
powers.” The agreed-upon “ultimate purpose” is to 
achieve an appropriate balance of power among the 
three spheres of government.305 
Putting aside the rules and standards distinctions for the reasons 
outlined above, Magill’s description of formalism in the separation 
of powers context tracks an understanding of formalism as com-
mitment to form.306  
Indeed, it is in separation of powers that one currently sees 
formalism taking a central role in the scholarship, being applied in 
 
 305 Id. at 1136–43 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 231 
(1991)). 
 306 See id. at 1138–40. 
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at least two ways: First, formalist separation of powers decisions 
are generally more concerned with giving effect to the forms laid 
out in the Constitution307 than with other considerations, such as 
convenience or giving effect to the justifications underlying those 
forms.308 One can readily identify Myers v. United States309 as 
more “formalist”310 than Morrison v. Olson311 because Myers pro-
duces a rule more closely tied to the forms described in the Consti-
tution312 than Morrison, which requires an analysis of the conse-
quences of any particular limit on the President’s power.313 That is 
not to say that Morrison does not attempt to follow the Constitu-
tion, just that Morrison is more concerned with satisfying what it 
 
 307 See O’Connell, supra note 298, at 899–900 (“A formalist approach, 
which focuses on structural attributes in defining the constitutional boundaries 
among the three branches, would find many boundary organizations problemat-
ic.”). 
 308 Pildes, Institutional Formalism, supra note 21, at 2 (“This formalism 
consists of treating the governmental institution involved as more or less a for-
mal black box to which the Constitution (or other source of law) allocates spe-
cific legal powers and functions.”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Formalism, 
Functionalism, Ignorance, Judges, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL’Y 13, 14–15 
(1998) (answering any number of functionalist arguments in voice of Robert 
Bork saying, “That’s not what the Constitution says”). 
 309 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
 310 See Magill, supra note 21, at 1138 n.37 (listing cases that show that Su-
preme Court uses both “formalist and functionalist approaches”). 
 311 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 312 See Myers, 272 U.S. at 116 (“From this division on principles, the rea-
sonable construction of the Constitution must be that the branches should be 
kept separate in all cases in which they were not expressly blended, and the 
Constitution should be expounded to blend them no more than it affirmatively 
requires.”). Even if one thinks that Chief Justice Taft’s understanding of the 
relative powers of the three branches was incorrect (that the correct understand-
ing of the “legislative” power includes with it the power to regulate removal of 
executive officers, see id. at 128), the analysis required is form-driven. Myers is 
itself a study in the distinction between formalism as an analytical tool and a 
methodology. Although the rule announced in Myers was formalist, see id. at 
175–76, the analysis leading to that formalist rule, which was largely a combina-
tion of intentionalist originalism and consequentialism, was not. 
 313 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693 (expressing concern over whether a limitation 
“sufficiently deprives the President of control . . . to interfere impermissibly 
with his constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws”). 
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considers the principles served by the forms rather than the forms 
themselves.314 
Second, formalist separation of powers approaches maintain 
that the forms described in the Constitution actually determine the 
answers in separation of powers cases.315 The determinism of sepa-
ration of powers formalism seemingly harkens to the Langdellian 
conceptualist formalism I’ve argued is a creature of the past,316 but 
this “formalist” determinism is actually quite different. Whereas 
conceptualist formalism supposedly maintained that first principles 
provide an answer to every legal question without gap,317 separa-
tion of powers formalism explicitly accepts the existence of gaps—
gaps in power whose consequence is that a particular exercise of 
power is unconstitutional because it does not fit the constitutional-
ly prescribed forms.318 Indeed, if Magill’s description of the func-
tionalist approach (whether a particular assertion of power advanc-
es “the ultimate purposes of a system of separation of powers”319) 
is correct, it is functionalists who more closely resemble the Lang-
dellian conceptualism of the past by suggesting that those “ulti-
mate purpose[s]” are both identifiable and are capable of determin-
ing the outcomes in every case.320 By relying on form rather than 
purpose, formalist approaches do not require that there be a con-
ceptually complete understanding like an “ultimate purpose” un-
 
 314 See Barnett, supra note 292, at 675–76 (describing Morrison as a “nota-
ble exception” to formalism that has dominated presidential removal decisions). 
 315 See Magill, supra note 21, at 1139–42 (“When examining the validity of 
an institutional arrangement . . . a formalist would first have to determine what 
sort of power these entities or officers were exercising.”). 
 316 See, e.g., Redish & Cisar, supra note 292, at 454 (“It is important to em-
phasize that formalism, as we employ the term, is not intended to imply imposi-
tion of rigid, abstract interpretational formulas derived from an originalistic 
perspective.”). 
 317 See Grey, supra note 104, at 7–8, 11 (“[T]he heart of classical theory was 
its aspiration that the legal system be made complete through universal formali-
ty, and universally formal through conceptual order.”). 
 318 See Lawson, supra note 14, at 859–60 (claiming that formalists find that 
“[a]ny exercise of governmental power . . . must either fit within one of the three 
formal categories thus established or find explicit constitutional authorization”). 
 319 Magill, supra note 21 at 1142 (quoting Merrill, supra note 223, at 231). 
 320 Id. at 1142. 
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derlying the system laid out in the Constitution321 because it is the 
forms, not the purposes of the Constitution that determine whether 
a particular power can be exercised by a particular part of the fed-
eral government.322 
The separation of powers context, which in many ways is an 
inquiry into the consequences of form, is an attractive place to ap-
ply a reconsidered conception of formalism, and it is here that one 
indeed sees formalism seriously engaged by both sides of the de-
bate. But if one truly engages formalism, the implications reach far 
beyond questions of process and separation of powers and certain-
ly beyond its typical modern application in statutory and constitu-
tional interpretation. Formalism has long been recognized as a way 
of thinking about law, although past debates have sought to limit it 
to either particular methodologies (in support of textualist and 
originalist claims) or readily refutable claims of complete determi-
nacy and intentional ignorance of consequences (in support of real-
ist ones), with both sides worried about the implications of formal-
ism for ascertaining the substance of the law. If we are all indeed 
formalists (as I claim we are), it is appropriate to consider the im-
plications of our formalism, implications of thinking about the 
form of law as distinct from its substance. When one steps aside 
from debates about formalism animated by concerns over the out-
comes it purportedly leads to, we are free to see the true power of 
 
 321 Formalist separation of powers approaches have been criticized for rely-
ing on “workable distinctions among the three categories of governmental pow-
er,” Magill, supra note 21, at 1141, which one could translate into similarly 
conceptually complete understandings of the difference between “executive,” 
“legislative,” and “judicial” power. See id. at 1139 (quoting Lawson, supra note 
14, at 859–60); see also Barnett, supra note 292, at 711 (“Formalism is ill-suited 
for interpreting indeterminate text.”). But that criticism of modern formalism is, 
like the Realist criticism of conceptualist formalism, a misplaced criticism of 
determinism, not formalism. Of course, as is the case with the modern anti-
formalist critique, there is little argument that separation of powers formalism is 
comparatively less deterministic than its functionalist counterpart. The question 
of whether a prosecutor’s function is “executive” is subject to more widespread 
agreement than whether a particular restriction on a particular officer is one that 
“sufficiently deprives the President of control . . . to interfere impermissibly 
with his constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws.” 
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693. 
 322 See Magill, supra note 21, at 1139–1140. 
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formalism as informing the content of law in ways distinct from 
case outcomes. 
III. FORMALISM AND THE LANGUAGE OF LAW 
Many are understandably consumed with formalism’s role in 
controlling outcomes in legal disputes—for determining the sub-
stance of the law.323 Most scholars (and hopefully all judges) seek 
approaches for their ability to determine outcomes, and students of 
formalism are no different. That was certainly true of the various 
approaches to formalism in the twentieth century debates. In the 
early, Langdellian orthodoxy, formalism provided a process for 
divining the common law.324 The early realists attacked formalism 
in order to provide space for their more pragmatic approach.325 The 
rise in the last half of the twentieth century of formalist methodol-
ogies like textualism and originalism were similarly driven by a 
desire to determine outcomes, albeit motivated by the desire to 
constrain judges rather than to realize some ultimate conception of 
law.326 The late twentieth century realist/pragmatist response simi-
larly attacked what it perceived as the formalism of textualism and 
originalism to provide discretion to judges to find better answers 
than could be found in the text.327 Those twentieth century debates, 
concerned as they were about how formalism might drive out-
comes, largely ignored formalism for its ability to understand law 
aside from outcomes. 
Formalism does have a role in driving outcomes, but the power 
of formalism goes beyond outcomes. Formalism not only provides 
a way to identify law’s content, it explains much of the meaning of 
 
 323 See, e.g., Grey, supra note 104, at 5 (emphasis added) (describing “heart 
of the theory” as Langdell’s idea “that through scientific methods lawyers could 
derive correct legal judgements”). 
 324 See Grey, supra note 104, at 5 (“Langdell believed that through scientific 
methods lawyers could derive correct legal judgments from a few fundamental 
principles and concepts . . . .”). 
 325 See, e.g., id. at 4–5. 
 326 Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 71, at 1176, 1184. 
 327 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Foundation, supra note 10, at 206; Dorf, supra 
note 14, at 9–10; Farber, Ages, supra note 5, at 91; Posner, supra note 6, at 
1157; Sunstein, Empirically, supra note 4, at 639. 
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law. Like rule-based decision-making, formalism requires the cat-
egorization of conduct, and that categorization has profound ef-
fects far outside the determination of cases.328 The categorization 
that formalism requires establishes the language of law, a language 
through which the law expresses societal approval and disapproval 
of particular conduct.329 That language (of social sanction and con-
demnation) affects the meaning of conduct far beyond the question 
of whether an individual will be held civilly or criminally liable.330 
A. Formalism’s Role in Legal Decision-making 
Absent the demands of formalism, there would be no need 
for—indeed, no means by which to have—conversations about the 
law. As discussed above, because law is a shared enterprise, the 
content of the law can only be described through reference to its 
form.331 Although our philosopher kings might be able to apply the 
law without reducing it to language, we cannot. If the form of the 
law determines the language we use to discuss legal concepts, the 
dictates of formalism control the conceptual language of law, and 
it is only through formalism that one can understand and realize 
the meaning of law, quite apart from the outcomes produced by 
law. 
1. FORMALISM AND CATEGORIES 
As Fred Schauer points out, rule-based decision-making is an 
exercise in generalization and, hence, categorization.332 Rules gen-
 
 328 Infra Part III.A.1. See generally SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 25–26, 10–
12. 
 329 Infra Part III.A.1. 
 330 Infra Part III.B. 
 331 See supra the text accompanying notes 47–51. 
 332 SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 25–26; see also HART, supra note 2, at 123 
(“All rules involve recognizing or classifying particular cases as instances of 
general terms.”); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influ-
ence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CALIF. L. REV. 
1103, 1125, 1131–32 (2004) (describing cognition and categorization in law); 
Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 581, 593 (1989) (“[I]t is the essence of the judicial function to 
draw lines, because it is the essence of the judicial function to be governed by 
lines, the lines of the logical and analytical categories.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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eralize by describing specific instances of conduct, such as the 
speed I happen to be driving, as either “over the limit” or “within 
the limit.” On Main Street, both thirty miles per hour and ninety 
miles per hour are “over the limit” compared to the twenty-five 
mile-per-hour speed limit, and both eight miles per hour and twen-
ty-four miles per hour are “within the limit.” Both statements are 
true even though thirty is only one-third as fast as ninety and twen-
ty-four is three times as fast as eight and whether I am an experi-
enced NASCAR driver in a golf cart covered in pillows or a blind-
folded inebriate driving a gasoline tanker. Conduct that looks quite 
different from some perspectives (even the limited perspective of 
dangerousness) is generalized by the twenty-five mile per hour 
speed limit as either “over the limit” or “within the limit.” 
In the course of generalizing, rules categorize. In the case of 
my speed example, the rule categorizes by lumping all speeds over 
twenty-five as “over the limit” and all speeds twenty-five and un-
der as “within the limit” but also by evaluating my driving in terms 
of its speed. Before a rule can be applied to conduct, the conduct 
must first be categorized as subject to the rule333—in my case, 
speeding instead of blindfolded driving or drunk driving. Schauer, 
in his institutional approach to rule-based decision-making, de-
scribes this function of rules as “jurisdictional” in that the rule, by 
including some conduct as within the rule and some conduct out-
side it, establishes the scope of the conduct subject to any particu-
lar adjudicator and, hence, its jurisdiction.334 In Schauer’s institu-
tional model, categorization both allows adjudicators to decide 
whether a rule has been violated and also allocates power between 
authors and appliers of law.335 The categories both provide the rule 
of decision and remove some aspects of conduct from the purview 
of the adjudicator. 
 
 333 SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 24 (“Once we separate a prescriptive rule’s 
factual predicate from its consequent, we see the factual predicate as a generali-
zation . . . .”); see also Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 534, 539–40 (on 
categories). 
 334 See SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 231–32 (“[T]hus, the essence of rule-
based decision-making lies in the concept of jurisdiction, for rules, which nar-
row the range of factors to be considered by particular decision-makers, estab-
lish and constrain the jurisdiction of those decision-makers.”). 
 335 See id. at 158, 231–232. 
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But, in addition to making it easier to decide cases or allocate 
power, the categorization that rules require has an another effect: it 
makes the categories themselves a relevant (or irrelevant) subject 
for law, and this is where formalism departs from rule-based deci-
sion-making. Formalism acknowledges that rules must appear in 
some form, and it is the form of those rules that controls the cate-
gories of conduct subject to legal regulation. Categorization is nec-
essary for decision by rule, but it is not the same as decision by 
rule. Before we can evaluate whether I’m exceeding the speed lim-
it, we have to agree that my speed is what is relevant rather than 
whether I am blindfolded or drunk. 
And it is the form of the rule that sets the categories. It is the 
traffic safety rule’s form as a speed limit that dictates an inquiry 
into a single attribute of my driving—how fast I am driving—as 
opposed to an open-ended inquiry as to whether my driving is like-
ly to result in some social harm. Conversely, if we phrase the in-
quiry as whether I am driving the car “well,” we don’t know 
whether we’re having a conversation about how fast I am driving, 
whether I have avoided hitting other cars or pedestrians, or wheth-
er I am driving with panache. Categorization limits the conversa-
tion to one about speed, drastically constricting the range of argu-
ments relevant to whether I have violated the applicable law. 
It is again tempting to revert to rules rather than form, but the 
act of categorization is driven by the rule’s form, not by the degree 
to which a particular mandate is either rule-like or standard-like. 
Form can limit arguments without setting a rule that determines 
outcomes. The inquiry into whether I am driving “too fast” is of a 
more limiting form than the inquiry into whether I am driving 
“well” because it requires me to ignore some aspects of “well” that 
are irrelevant to my speed, such as whether I am blindfolded. The 
form of the inquiry is a limitation on available arguments even 
though “too fast” (like “well”) more closely resembles a standard 
than a rule. Even among standards, form has power. Tort law’s 
categorization of conduct as “reasonable” and “unreasonable” sug-
gests a different comparison between actors than if the law had 
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settled on “cautious” or “thoughtful” as the standard for avoiding 
liability in a negligence action.336 
Recognizing the power of form to categorize presents an addi-
tional challenge to the anti-formalist critique, which is centered 
largely on formalism’s inability to provide what critics consider to 
be suitably determinative outcomes.337 That is not to say that form 
is irrelevant to outcomes; it certainly is. Under the common law 
forms of action, failure to satisfy the form dictated by a particular 
writ necessarily led to the lack of a remedy: the forms dictated by 
the writs dictated the substantive law.338 But the force of law is not 
only its determinations, it is also in the categories we use to talk 
about whether behavior is an appropriate subject for the legal sys-
tem in the first place. In order for critics of formalism to complete 
their case, they need to recognize and answer this second strength 
of formalism over other methods of legal inquiry, particularly real-
ism, which provides answers without need or benefit of clear cate-
gories.339 Focused as it is on outcomes, the realist critique general-
ly ignores the effect of law on argumentation—that arguments are 
either included or excluded from consideration, not by virtue of the 
substance of the law, but by its form.340 Llewellyn was more right 
than he knew when he explained that “to classify is to disturb.”341 
It is not that outcomes are irrelevant, but it takes little imagina-
tion to visualize how different our legal system would be if out-
comes—even identical outcomes—were dictated by notions of 
justice unencumbered by the necessities and inconveniences of 
form. Such “rule of law” concerns are at the root of much of the 
formalist enterprise; they certainly were for Justice Scalia when he 
declared, “Of all the criticisms leveled against textualism, the most 
mindless is that it is formalistic. The answer to that is, of course 
 
 336 See BEEVER, supra note 129, at 253–54. 
 337 See supra Part I.B.3. 
 338 Subrin, supra note 165, at 914–16. 
 339 See id. at 1001 (discussing how realism “became skepticism about any 
type of legal categories and definitions”). 
 340 See id. 
 341 Llewellyn, supra note 98, at 453. Llewellyn did not seem to notice that 
his response—to continually adjust the “received categories,” id., based on new 
information—was no less a disturbance than the “received” categorization he 
resisted. 
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it’s formalistic! The rule of law is about form . . . . Long live for-
malism! It is what makes us a government of laws and not of 
men.”342 It is not the social optimality or political legitimacy of 
legal outcomes that distinguish law from majority vote or brute 
force, it is law’s reliance on form and what that form requires of 
legal actors in the course of generating those outcomes. Formalism 
does not reject the possibility of any particular outcome; it rejects 
the possibility of philosopher kings. Any evaluation of formalism 
must include in its calculus the value that form contributes to the 
process of generating outcomes, not just the outcomes that the pro-
cess generates. 
2. DETERMINACY VS. THE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS 
Even if formalism’s categories do not always lead to definite 
outcomes, they nevertheless shape the deliberative process. Such 
has been the experience of both the Due Process343 and Equal Pro-
tection Clauses344 of the Constitution. Equal protection, in particu-
lar, has faced a troubled history despite the fact that all can agree 
on the nature of the equality inquiry345: that it is a comparative one. 
This is so because the equality comparison lacks any meaningful 
and widely agreed upon form346 and therefore lacks workable cate-
gories for analysis;347 there is nothing inherent in the concept of 
“equality” to tell us what is relevant or irrelevant in any particular 
 
 342 Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 11, at 25 (emphases in original). 
 343 U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV § 1. 
 344 Id. amend. XIV § 1. 
 345 See, e.g., Derek W. Black, The Contradiction Between Equal Protection’s 
Meaning and Its Legal Substance: How Deliberate Indifference Can Cure It, 15 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 533, 534–36 (2007) (explaining that question of 
“what is means to deny someone equal protection under the law” has a complex 
history, especially with regard to racial discrimination). 
 346 In this regard, one can also compare the history of procedural due pro-
cess, which deals with a relatively small, closed set of procedural forms, with 
substantive due process, which deals with a limitless, open set of substantive 
ones. 
 347 See Black, supra note 345, at 534 (“The predominant meaning [of equal 
protection under the law] at any single time has often been more of a reflection 
of the cultural context than of an inherent legal principle.”). 
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application of the “equality” comparison.348 But it would be a mis-
take to consider the Equal Protection Clause, or equal protection 
doctrine, a failure for its inability to land upon a widely shared and 
readily applicable rule for determining when the protection of the 
law is equal enough for the Constitution. 
The value of the rule requiring “equal protection of the law”349 
is not primarily in its ability to determine outcomes in cases, it is in 
the form it gives to the deliberative process. The Equal Protection 
Clause explicitly rejects arguments from inequality (that I should 
receive a benefit in order to preserve inequality or that a new ine-
quality should be created to benefit me) and renders irrelevant a 
variety of other arguments that do not sound in equality (such as, 
that I should receive a benefit if doing so increases net social wel-
fare). Even if the Equal Protection Clause is a failure at determina-
tively classifying conduct, it is a comparatively modest success by 
requiring adjudicators to categorize arguments by their connection 
to equality. The Equal Protection Clause does generate outcomes 
that themselves shape society,350 but more important than the indi-
vidual outcomes (America is a fundamentally different place be-
cause whites and blacks go to public school together;351 it is not 
clear that America is a fundamentally different place because Ok-
lahoma can regulate opticians differently than optometrists352 even 
though both outcomes are the product of the Equal Protection 
Clause) is that the Equal Protection Clause’s mandate is instantiat-
ed in the form of a rule of equality. Relying on the form “equality” 
encourages legal actors to make arguments in terms of equality and 
 
 348 SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 227 (noting lack of a social understanding of 
“equality” sufficient to provide its legal meaning); Peter Westen, The Empty 
Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547 (1982) (“Without moral standards, 
equality remains meaningless, a formula that can have nothing to say about how 
we should act. With such standards, equality becomes superfluous, a formula 
that can do nothing but repeat what we already know.”). 
 349 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
 350 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (finding state 
laws establishing racial segregation in schools to be unconstitutional). 
 351 Id. at 494–95 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–500 (1954). 
 352 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 486, 491 (1955). 
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requires courts to explain their decisions in terms of equality.353 By 
adopting the form “equal protection,”354 the Constitution injects 
equality into the deliberative process and does so even in cases in 
which equality provides little guidance as to the right outcome. 
Even if equality’s indeterminacy renders it unattainable in practice, 
we can all agree that the quest for “equal protection of the laws”355 
remains important. 
The Constitution is not the sole locus of American aspiration, 
but it is an important one,356 and equality is included among its 
values by virtue of the form of the Equal Protection Clause. A sim-
ilar mandate requiring states to treat all citizens with “fairness” or 
in accordance with the “law of the land”357 (or simply afford them 
“due process of law”358) might drive courts to similar outcomes but 
would structure the deliberative inquiry, and the terms of debate, 
completely differently. That equality enjoys the position of promi-
nence it does in American constitutional discourse is the product of 
the form of the Equal Protection Clause. 
3. FORMALISM AS INFORMATION FORCING 
This is all a rather long way of saying that formalism’s value is 
not in avoiding the indeterminacy and, hence, discretion that Hart 
himself identified exists in hard cases;359 it is to enable us to dis-
tinguish those cases when discretion is being applied from those 
that it is not and to distinguish different kinds of discretion from 
each other. A judge applying a speeding law can credibly claim she 
is not exercising discretion; a judge applying a reckless driving law 
less so. A judge who finds my driving “reckless” has taken for her-
 
 353 See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S. at 492–95 (providing an example of “equal 
protection” analysis encouraging equality and discouraging inequality). 
 354 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
 355 Id. 
 356 H. Jefferson Powell, Constitutional Virtues, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 369, 372–
73, 378–79 (2006). 
 357 Nachbar, supra note 156, at 1639–40. 
 358 Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (striking same-
sex sodomy law for lack of “legitimate state interest” as due process violation), 
with id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (finding an equal 
protection violation). 
 359 HART, supra note 2, at 127–28. 
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self more authority than one who finds it “over the limit.” Similar-
ly, when the legislature displaces discretion with rules (such as by 
setting a numerical blood alcohol limit for drunk-driving viola-
tions), it allocates authority away from judges. If rules operate to 
allocate discretion away from adjudicators to authors, formalism 
allows us to identify whether such an allocation has taken place—it 
requires both authors and adjudicators to account for allocations of 
authority within the legal system. 
4. FORMALISM AND COMMUNICATION 
By emphasizing forms over substance, formalism allows the 
debate to move up a level of abstraction—from discussion about 
individual outcomes to the rules that lead to those outcomes. This 
happens at a basic level whenever a court announces not just the 
outcome of a case but also the rule that generated the outcome. 
Outcomes (“the lower court ruling is affirmed” or “the case is re-
manded with an instruction to enter judgment for appellant”) do 
little to guide behavior; it is the rule announced in a particular case 
that provides that guidance.360 Rules categorize,361 and the form 
the rule takes drives that categorization. Thus, while formalism is 
not the same as rule-based decision-making,362 it is essential to 
talking about the rules being applied in a system of rule-based de-
cision-making. Just as it’s hard to compare two tables without talk-
ing about attributes of form,363 it’s hard to talk about two rules (or 
apply one) without discussing the form they take. 
B. Formalism and the Expressive Function of the Law 
Law’s power to communicate has been the focus of much work 
on the “expressive function” of the law.364 According to expressive 
theories, law not only affects behavior by setting sanctions, behav-
 
 360 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. 
REV. 802, 808 (1982). 
 361 See supra Part III.A.1. 
 362 See supra Part I.A.2. 
 363 See Weinrib, supra note 8, at 958–59. 
 364 See generally MCADAMS, supra note 34, at 1–9; Anderson & Pildes, 
supra note 34, at 1503 (providing an overview of expressive theories of practical 
reason and then arguing that law is expressive in nature). 
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iors change according to the message those sanctions convey.365 
For instance, imprisonment and fines operate on society different-
ly; the form of a sanction alters its meaning,366 and different rules 
can have different “expressive dimensions.”367 Laws alter social 
norms by altering the meaning of behavior.368 According to ex-
pressive theories, law not only regulates, it communicates.369 
As described above, that communication occurs more through 
the form of law than through its content. The point is intuitive with 
regard to the criminal law. If particular conduct is recognized as 
socially undesirable, it can be addressed any number of ways. If 
cars driven quickly are dangerous, we can exclude cars from a par-
ticular location (like a pedestrian mall), prohibit the selling of cars 
capable of exceeding twenty-five miles per hour, provide subsidies 
for public transportation, build bike lanes, punish speeders, or out-
law other activities that combine with speed to make cars more 
dangerous, such as texting while driving. Even if each choice 
equally reduces the number of car-related injuries, it does so in 
different ways, and those differences dramatically affect the social 
meaning of the underlying conduct. Those differences are realized 
by the form of the rule used to effectuate the social goal. The point 
is exaggerated in the distinction between subsidizing public trans-
portation and a criminal prohibition on texting, but the same dif-
ference in expressive content is presented in the choice to interpret 
two different criminal rules. Suppose two possible choices for out-
lawing texting while driving: a statute that criminalizes texting 
while driving or a judicial interpretation of the reckless driving 
statute to include texting while driving as “reckless.” A statute out-
lawing texting while driving carries different meaning than defin-
 
 365 MCADAMS, supra note 34, at 136–38; Feinberg, supra note 34, at 400; 
Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 
339, 371–72 (2000). 
 366 Kahan, supra note 34, at 620. 
 367 Hellman, supra note 34, at 3 n.10. The expressive dimension of a rule is 
distinct from the effect that the rule’s substance has on behavior. Compare id. 
with Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 
943, 946–47 (1995) (on “social meaning” of rules). 
 368 Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 34, at 2024–25. 
 369 Id. at 2050 (“For law to perform its expressive function well, it is im-
portant that law communicate well.”). 
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ing texting while driving as “reckless driving,” and those differ-
ences stem from differences in the form of the mandate, even if the 
punishment for texting while driving is identical to that for reckless 
driving. 
The same is true for the inclusion of conduct within the legal 
system at all. Waging war against the United States subjects one to 
lethal targeting by U.S. armed forces, but it is also punishable as 
treason if done by someone who owes allegiance to the United 
States.370 Although it is conceivable that the threat of a treason 
conviction provides additional deterrent to those citizens consider-
ing waging war against the United States, reliance on the criminal 
form also conveys American society’s view that those who owe 
allegiance to the United States have a distinct duty not to wage war 
against the United States;371 a duty that is not conveyed by a more 
extreme sanction (lethal targeting, essentially death without legal 
process) delivered in another form (as the product of armed con-
flict).372 Treason’s “wrongness” is communicated by its criminality 
in a way that lethal targeting does not. The same is true of Ameri-
ca’s drug laws, which not only seek to solve the problem of drug 
abuse but to convey a message about drug use through the choice 
of means for doing so.373 
 
 370 18 U.S.C. § 2381. 
 371 Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 147, 155 (1873). On the 
Framers’ problematical relationship with treason, see Cramer v. United States, 
325 U.S. 1, 8–12 (1945). 
 372 The same is true of terrorism (punishable under Title 18), although terror-
ism can exist outside the context of armed conflict and so does not present the 
same equality of opportunity for resolution by legal or military means. As a 
practical matter, though, the United States considers itself to be in an armed 
conflict with any number of organizations that employ terrorism, (including both 
al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), which means terrorists partici-
pating on behalf of either organization subject to three different actions: (1) 
criminal conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 2332; 10 U.S.C. § 950t(2); (2) lethal targeting, 
see Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 
Stat. 224, 224 (2001); or (3) to the extent they present a continuing threat to the 
United States, detention without trial, see Exec. Order No. 13567, 3 C.F.R. 
§ 227 (2011). Defining terrorism as a crime has as much to do with applying the 
criminal form to terrorism as it does with either deterring or incapacitating ter-
rorists. 
 373 See 21 U.S.C. § 801. 
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And what is true of substance is doubly true of procedure, 
which, as described above,374 is explicitly tied to form. The Sixth 
Amendment’s situation of juries as criminal adjudicators com-
municates a message about the relative role of judges and juries, 
even in cases in which either would reach an identical result,375 and 
even if, as the debate between Justices Scalia and Stevens in Neder 
shows, the content of that message is not perfectly clear.376 
Although formalist approaches do not necessarily account for 
all of these expressive influences of form, formalism itself pro-
vides the intellectual space to do so by distinguishing the form of a 
rule from both its content and its justification. It is only by consid-
ering the forms of law separately—as distinct from driving particu-
lar case outcomes—that we can appreciate all of the ways that 
forms control how we talk about and consequently think about law. 
Law’s form influences behavior and social meaning apart from the 
degree to which rules of a particular form instantiate their underly-
ing justifications. 
CONCLUSION 
Formalism has a long history in American legal thought, serv-
ing a primarily antagonistic role in both historical and modern de-
bates.377 But the arguments over formalism made both in support 
of formalist methodologies and in derision of them has blinded 
many to its deeper meaning. Many criticisms of formalism—both 
historical and modern—are really criticisms of the possibility that 
law can be perfectly determinative, a question that is not presented 
any more centrally by formalism than by other forms of legal 
thinking. Holmes, for instance, embraced formality while rejecting 
the determinism of legal conceptualism.378 To the extent that the 
attack on formalism is motivated by concerns about its determina-
 
 374 See supra Part II.B. 
 375 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 376 See Neder v. United States 527 U.S. 1, 28 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 377 See TAMANAHA, supra note 23, at 1–3. 
 378 See Grey, supra note 104, at 44 (“[G]eneral principles do not decide con-
crete cases.”(quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting)). 
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cy,379 those criticisms are misguided, at least as to formalism as 
practiced today, which is predicated not on determinacy but rather 
on the inherent indeterminacy of law. Another typecast villain, 
Lochner v. New York, unites critics of formalism of all stripes by 
its purported claim to deterministic simplicity.380 I think such 
claims are overstated, but Lochner (and the criticism it has attract-
ed over time) provides a good vehicle for distinguishing determin-
ism from formalism, since Lochner, while possibly falsely deter-
ministic, was hardly formalist. 
It is possible to derive from all the heat and light that formal-
ism has generated a definition of formalism that serves not only its 
followers but its critics: as commitment to form in legal discourse. 
“Commitment to form” may seem like a fairly weak place for a 
movement as widely and hotly debated as formalism, but attention 
to form can have considerable consequences. Formalism is not ag-
nostic to the effect of those forms—formalism is an argument to 
apply the forms of law in preference to deducing the justifications 
represented by those forms and attempting to apply those justifica-
tions directly. Others have already covered much ground in dis-
cussing how paying attention to particular forms (especially text in 
both its present and original meanings) can drive outcomes,381 but 
formalism is much broader than textualism or originalism: it is a 
claim about the role of form more generally and includes argu-
ments about form not specific to text, including claims about the 
structure and source of legal materials, claims that resonate in posi-
tivist legal thinking. In addition to its contribution to understanding 
substance, formalism allows for the independent value of form and 
provides a lens through which to realize meaning in law unrecog-
nized by non-formalist methodologies. Hardly an exercise in rigid 
thinking, formalism allows for nuance that cannot be captured by 
considering law as a system that simply produces legal outcomes. 
In the end, formalism is the product of acknowledging that 
law’s meaning can only be revealed through its forms. Conse-
quently, it is the forms of law that control the terms by which we 
understand and discuss the law; it is the forms of law that provide 
 
 379 Id. at 39–40. 
 380 See supra Part I.B.2. 
 381 See supra Part II.A. 
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the language of the law. The categories required by law’s forms 
effectively label conduct, not only as “legal” and “illegal” (which 
are outcomes) but also as within or outside of legal review. The 
forms of our legal rules drive not only our thinking about legal 
questions, but also capture society’s aspirations, even for questions 
not readily subject to legal determination.382 By acknowledging the 
power of the form of law, formalism offers a richer understanding 
of law as an act of communication. In addition to prescribing and 
proscribing conduct, forms of law express social values, and for-
malism is an approach unique in its ability to account for these 
widely varying roles of form. 
That is not to say that that accounting is complete. Saying that 
to ignore form is to miss much of the value of the law does not 
answer the question of what role form should serve in any particu-
lar context. I have offered only a rudimentary start on that enter-
prise. By reclaiming the mantel of “formalism” from its role as 
both weapon and target and by identifying how it can provide a 
unique perspective on law, we can reboot old debates over formal-
ism—to retake formalism from its place as an epithet and allow it 
to serve as a vehicle for inquiry into the role and value of form in 
the legal system. 
 
 382 See supra Part III.B. 
